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ARTICLE 
PROPERTY IS A TWO-WAY STREET:  PERSONAL 
COPYRIGHT USE AND IMPLIED 
AUTHORIZATION 
Michael Grynberg* 
 
When we use the Internet, we know that copyright law limits our 
freedom.  We know, for example, that downloading popular music is legally 
risky.  Those who want to get moralistic about it argue that illegal 
downloading violates a “property” right of the copyright holder.  But what 
about our property rights in our computers?  Even if copyright is a form of 
property, it maintains a parallel existence as an intrusion upon property 
rights.  This intrusion is increasingly a part of daily life, as copyright’s 
literal scope sweeps broadly enough to threaten a range of everyday 
activities that social norms regard as acceptable. 
These observations form the basis of a “moral” critique of copyright 
law, but they do not figure prominently in modern doctrine.  This Article 
looks to the common law property rights of copyright users to develop a 
framework for limiting copyright’s reach.  If we take seriously traditional 
rules governing the interplay between statutes and preexisting common law 
rights, courts have room to incorporate user property rights into copyright 
doctrine.  First, the common law provides a baseline against which the 
Copyright Act should be construed.  Courts should be reluctant to interpret 
the statute in a manner that negates longstanding expectations that 
personal property may be used in conjunction with copyrighted material for 
personal purposes. 
Second, the property rights of copyright users offer a new foundation for 
implied license doctrine.  Instead of looking solely to the conduct of the 
licensor (i.e., the copyright holder) to determine whether an implied license 
to use copyrighted content exists, courts should appreciate the reasonable 
expectations of consumers in their control of personal property used to 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law.  My thanks to 
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interact with the protected works.  Expanding our conception of implied 
license in this manner would help address the uneasy status of personal 
uses of copyrighted works under modern law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When we venture online, we know that copyright law limits our freedom.  
We know, for example, that making and posting a mashup video that uses 
popular songs tempts litigation.  If we want to get moralistic about it, we 
might say that the risk comes from using the “property” of copyright 
holders.  Fair enough,1 but what about our property rights in our computers?  
Copyright law cannot exist without limiting them. 
The same is true of “intellectual property” (IP) generally.  Authors, 
inventors, and other creators of ideal goods have entitlements with some of 
the attributes of property,2 but these powers come at the expense of the 
 
 1. For the sake of argument, anyway. But see infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 2. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (“The ownership of a copyright may be 
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may 
be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate 
succession.”); 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property.”).  The label intellectual “property” is itself controversial 
because it carries the rhetorical implication that patents, copyrights, and their like deserve 
treatment as property in the same way as do land and personal property.  For that reason, 
opponents of strong intellectual property (IP) rights often favor different nomenclatures. See, 
e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008); 
Tom W. Bell, Copyright as Intellectual Property Privilege, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 523 
(2008). 
  A number of articles discuss restrictions imposed by IP holders on the objects 
embodying their protected right as being a form of servitude. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of 
the Apocryphal Axe:  Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual 
Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 506 n.479 (1999) (collecting sources).  Although I note 
analogous examples in developing my theory of implied authorization, see, for example, 
infra notes 159–61 and accompanying text, my focus is elsewhere.  This Article focuses on 
the manner in which IP law regulates not property that embodies protected content, but 
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property rights of others.  Third parties cannot use their tools, be they 
printing presses or computers, to tread upon IP rights.3  In effect, IP exists 
as a negative easement.4 
While the insight that intellectual property burdens third-party property 
rights is not new, its ramifications are surprisingly scarce in modern 
doctrine.  This Article addresses the gap in copyright law.  Copyright’s 
modern expansion casts doubt on the legality of a wide range of everyday 
copyright uses.  Greater sensitivity to the property rights of copyright users 
offers new avenues for protecting personal use rights.  First, common law 
property rights provide a baseline against which the Copyright Act may be 
construed.  Courts should be reluctant to interpret the statute in a manner 
that negates longstanding consumer expectations of a right to use personal 
property in conjunction with copyrighted material. 
Second, the property rights of copyright users present a new foundation 
for an expanded implied license doctrine.  Instead of looking solely to the 
conduct of the licensor to determine whether an implied license to use 
copyrighted content exists, courts should appreciate the reasonable 
expectations of copyright users in their control of personal property used to 
interact with protected works.  Enlarging our conception of implied 
license—for convenience, I call this expanded understanding implied 
authorization—would help address the uneasy status of personal uses under 
modern copyright doctrine. 
Part I explains the problem facing personal copyright uses.  Modern 
copyright law suffers from a split personality.  Copyright’s literal scope 
sweeps so broadly as to apparently prohibit a range of everyday activities.5  
But we nonetheless engage in them as a matter of course.  By our actions, 
we may trust that we have a right to copy purchased music for personal use, 
but when push comes to shove—when there may be legal ramifications—
the true state of the law is muddy.6 
 
personal property used to interact with such content.  My interest is in the record player, not 
the record. 
 3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (copyrights); 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271 (patents). 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
 5. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Infringement Nation:  Copyright Reform and the 
Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543–48 (describing a hypothetical day in the life 
filled with ordinary activities that collectively incur $12.45 million in potential liability 
under the Copyright Act). 
 6. Compare, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 
180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999) (comparing space shifting to time shifting blessed in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)), with UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting 
space shifting argument applied to My.MP3.com as “simply another way of saying that the 
unauthorized copies are being retransmitted in another medium—an insufficient basis for 
any legitimate claim of transformation”).  And those of us who are sure are not necessarily 
sure as to why. See Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 597 
(2008) [hereinafter Litman, Goo]; Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1871, 1903 (2007) [hereinafter Litman, Lawful Personal Use] (noting that were many 
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Two well-documented trends spurred the increased prominence of 
copyright’s law/norm mismatch.  First, copyrights are more robust than a 
century ago.  They are stronger, last longer, and cover more works.7  
Second, the Internet’s popularization increased both the ease and notoriety 
of potential infringements.8  Public collisions between legal interpretation 
and socially acceptable practice are increasingly likely. 
This law/norm divide is especially problematic with respect to personal 
uses of copyrighted matter.9  Individuals are ill-equipped to navigate the 
difficulties of either licensing or litigating access to copyrights.  The effort 
can flummox the most sophisticated, well-capitalized parties.10  To be sure, 
most personal uses of copyrighted works go unchallenged by rights holders.  
It is problematic, however, for everyday activities to depend on the 
potentially fickle toleration of copyright owners.  And if everyday life 
becomes a more digitally mediated experience, the toleration model is an 
unstable basis on which to rest future cultural development.11 
Copyright law has not developed an effective response.  The fair use 
doctrine offers an obvious safety valve for some personal uses,12 but the 
doctrine is unpredictable in application.  Supreme Court precedent directs 
lower courts to apply the doctrine in a case-specific manner, which stifles 
the development of clear guidelines for acceptable and non-acceptable 
unauthorized copyright uses.13  And even if fair use’s potential is undersold, 
advocates of strong personal use rights may well wonder at the wisdom of 
placing too many eggs in a single doctrinal basket. 
Some suggest greater use of implied licenses as an alternative to fair use.  
Implied copyright licenses traditionally ameliorated difficulties arising from 
copyright law’s division of ownership between a copyright and the work 
that embodies protected expression.  A party who commissions a work but 
fails to bargain for the copyright may still claim a license to use the work 
even if the use implicates rights protected by the Copyright Act.14 
Implied licenses may sweep more broadly in the online world, but efforts 
to expand their use suffer from a core weakness.  Even broad licenses may 
be revoked.  Traditional understandings do not support a doctrine robust 
 
personal uses to be challenged, “[c]opyright lawyers may disagree on what theory the 
copyright owner should lose, but not about the ultimate result”). 
 7. See infra Part I.A. 
 8. See infra Part I.A. 
 9. This Article uses Jessica Litman’s definition of personal use.  A personal use is “a 
use that an individual makes for herself, her family, or her close friends.” Litman, Lawful 
Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1894. 
 10. See generally Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 
F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998) (litigating whether a 1939 music license allowing use of 
composition in film also authorized use in video version of the film). 
 11. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 13. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not 
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for 
case-by-case analysis.”). 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
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enough to overcome such revocations.  If copyright implied license is to be 
broadened, another legal basis is needed.15  Otherwise, reform efforts based 
in implied license will be vulnerable to a plausible formalist objection:  
section 106 of the Copyright Act vests in the copyright holder the exclusive 
right to authorize acts regulated by the statute.16 
Part II responds by arguing that with respect to copyright users, the 
Copyright Act is not the only relevant law.  Whatever the status of 
copyright as “property” in the same sense as land or chattels, copyright is 
simultaneously an interference with property rights.17  Each copyright 
holder has an effective negative easement in the tools others might use to 
interact with copyright-protected material.  This characterization brings into 
play the common law property rights of copyright users.  They are 
important for three reasons.  First, they make clear that a copyright action is 
more than an effort to prevent a “trespass” to property rights, but is 
simultaneously a mediation of competing property interests.  Second, 
judges construe statutes against the baseline created by common law 
principles and rights.  Courts are traditionally reluctant to read legislation as 
interfering with expectations based in the common law absent a clear 
statutory command.  Third, even when a statute alters the common law 
baseline, traditional understandings remain a source of law to fill gaps in 
the displacing statute.18 
Part III explores the consequences of these observations.  The common 
law property rights of copyright users provide the basis both for a 
narrowing construction of the Copyright Act and for a revised copyright 
implied license doctrine.  A complete doctrine would incorporate not only 
the conduct of the copyright licensor, but also the property-based 
expectations of the putative licensee.  Although copyright law necessarily 
displaces and limits a user’s common law property rights and expectations, 
it does not extinguish them.  They remain a part of the baseline against 
which the Copyright Act writes.  When construing Congress’s handiwork, it 
is appropriate to interpret the statute against this baseline, particularly with 
respect to establishing what uses are “authorized.”  The reasonable 
expectations of copyright users about their rights to their own property help 
determine when a particular use would be perceived as permitted. 
What then defines the reasonable expectations of copyright users?  
Courts may look to governing social norms that they are prepared to ratify 
as reasonable.  Using a computer to space shift music from a CD to an iPod 
might be acceptable in a way that surreptitious use of a video camera inside 
a movie theater is not.  In this manner, courts may account doctrinally for 
the lack of congruence between copyright rights as perceived by their 
holders and actual public practices.  These practices can help shape judicial 
interpretations of what a user may reasonably assume is within the scope of 
 
 15. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 16. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See infra Part II.E. 
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her rights when using copyrighted works, as well as the level of conduct 
required of copyright holders to “revoke” that authorization through the 
assertion of rights under the Copyright Act. 
This latter point is essential.  To be viable, the approach advocated here 
must respect Congress’s delegation to copyright owners of the exclusive 
right to authorize the protected acts of section 106.  But while the statute 
gives copyright holders the exclusive right to authorize certain acts, it does 
not define authorization or the manner in which authorization is to be 
implemented.  A statutory gap exists.  And in fact, copyright owners engage 
in a range of choices with respect to enforcing their copyrights.  When 
courts evaluate what these choices authorize or forbid, they should look to 
the reasonable property-backed expectations of licensees as an 
indispensable part of the analysis. 
I.  COPYRIGHT AND THE PROBLEM OF “TOLERATED” USES 
This part sketches the problem of copyright’s expansion and the potential 
ramifications for personal copyright liberties.  The story is a familiar one, 
and more extensive accounts are available elsewhere.19  The purpose here is 
neither to win converts to the anti-expansionist cause nor defend it against 
counterattacks.  My concern is with the doctrinal challenge of limiting 
copyright’s growth, assuming the premise that the enterprise is a worthy 
one.  After considering the structural difficulties of reform and the 
limitations of the fair use doctrine, this part concludes by considering 
proposals to bolster the use of implied licenses as a check to broad 
assertions of copyright. 
A.  The Challenges of Modern Copyright 
Copyright’s potential scope exists uneasily alongside many everyday, 
unauthorized, and arguably infringing uses of copyrighted material.  This 
collision of law and norms—more precisely, its current prominence—is the 
culmination of two trends:  copyright’s expansion and the Internet’s 
popularization.  Infringement is both simple and public in a digital, 
networked environment.  Cracking down on infringement may harm 
personal use rights because copyright doctrine has done a poor job of 
developing safeguards to protect them. 
1.  Copyright’s Growth 
Both Congress and the judiciary may claim credit for the growth in 
copyright’s scope. 
 
 19. See, e.g., Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 591–96. 
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a.  Congress 
Congress consistently strengthened the power of copyright over the last 
four decades.20  Its handiwork makes copyrights easier to obtain,21 more 
powerful,22 longer lasting,23 and buttressed by laws that control access to 
copyrighted works when technology alone cannot do the trick.24  To be 
sure, the Copyright Act also checks copyright’s reach.25  And it has been 
argued that the 1976 Act’s rewrite of copyright law was intended largely as 
a conservative enterprise that would preserve the traditional balance of 
interests between copyright users and owners.26  Unfortunately, there is a 
 
 20. Two key milestones are the 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, and the addition in 1972 of a distinct copyright in 
sound recordings, rather than simply in the musical composition. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. 
L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. 
 21. The 1976 Act reduced the importance of copyright formalities by liberalizing the 
requirement that a copyright holder affix a notice of copyright on her work. Copyright Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 405, 90 Stat. 2541.  Congress later dispensed with the 
requirement altogether, Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, and 
opened the door for foreign authors to reclaim U.S. copyright to works that were unprotected 
due to a failure to adhere to domestic formalities. 17 U.S.C. § 104A. 
  The 1976 Act further liberalized copyright law by providing that copyright subsists 
“in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a).  Under the predecessor 1909 Act, copyright extended only to works published with 
proper notice. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 9 (1909), renumbered § 10, repealed 1978).  The 1976 statute also eliminated 
the distinction between published works, which received federal protection, and unpublished 
works, which until then had not. 
 22. The 1976 Act added a new right of public display and defined public performance 
broadly enough to supersede a narrow construction given the right by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. See Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 592 n.35; infra Part III.D.1.b. 
 23. Under the 1909 Act, the copyright term lasted twenty-eight years and could be 
renewed for an additional twenty-eight years.  17 U.S.C. § 24 (1909) (repealed 1978).  The 
1976 Act extended the term to the life of the author plus fifty years or, in the case of works 
for hire, the shorter of seventy-five years from publication or 100 years from creation. 90 
Stat. 2541.  In 1998, Congress further extended the term to the life of the author plus seventy 
years or the shorter of ninety-five years from publication or 120 years from creation in the 
case of works made for hire. Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006)). 
 24. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) proscribed the unauthorized 
circumvention of technological measures designed to control access to copyrighted works 
and restricted the development and distribution of tools designed to circumvent 
technological measures that control access or protect copyright rights held by the copyright 
owner. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.  Critics contend the statute interferes with the ability of users to 
engage in fair and otherwise legal uses of copyrighted content. See, e.g., Unintended 
Consequences:  Ten Years Under the DMCA, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 6 (Oct. 28, 2008), 
http://www.eff.org/files/DMCAUnintended10.pdf. 
 25. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110 (precluding copyright rights over performance and display 
from applying to certain activities).  Professor Litman notes that in revising the copyright 
statute, Congress generally sought to preserve the status quo with respect to established 
copyright uses with specific carveouts of the sort found in § 110. See Litman, Goo, supra 
note 6, at 591–96. 
 26. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 593 (“Congress’s rewording of the reproduction, 
adaptation and distribution rights were understood as simplification and codification of the 
scope of those rights under the law as construed by the courts, and not as enhancements of 
their reach or strength.”). 
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mismatch in the textual specificity of these two sides of the copyright coin.  
The statute uses broad language to define copyright rights.  Section 106 of 
the Act gives copyright holders exclusive rights to “reproduce,” 
“distribute,” “perform,” “display,” and “prepare derivative works based 
upon” copyrighted works.27  These broad grants leave courts with discretion 
to enforce powerful copyrights.28 
In contrast, copyright’s limitations—with the notable exception of fair 
use, discussed below29—are tightly cast.30  Compare, for example, the 
broad definition of the performance right with its exceptions.31  Many of the 
latter are written as narrow carveouts not designed for the public at large.32  
Similar examples dot the statute.33 
Moreover, the overlapping nature of the rights granted by section 106 
undermines the Copyright Act’s limitations.  Litigation over Cablevision’s 
efforts to provide customers with off-site DVRs is an example.34  Copyright 
holders maintained that keeping DVR storage capacity at Cablevision’s 
facilities rendered the company directly liable for infringement.35  
 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 28. Some of these terms are defined elsewhere in the statute, but broadly. See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (defining “derivative work” as “a work based upon one or more preexisting works, 
such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture 
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted”) (emphasis added). Compare Mirage 
Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 1341, 1343–44 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(concluding that lawfully purchased prints that were glued onto tiles and resold constituted 
derivative works), with Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 1997) (disagreeing 
with Mirage on similar facts). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see infra Part I.B.1. 
 30. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 593 (“By articulating exclusive rights in general, 
broad language and delineating exceptions in narrow, detailed, specific language, the drafters 
of the statute time-proofed the exclusive rights, while leaving the specific exceptions 
vulnerable to obsolescence.”).  Professor Litman traces the mismatch to the process behind 
the statute’s drafting, describing it as a negotiation between industry interests. Jessica 
Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 280–81 
(1989). 
 31. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, 
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the 
sounds accompanying it audible.”), with id. § 110. 
 32. See, e.g., id. § 110(5)(B) (setting size and device limits for establishments permitted 
to communicate transmissions made by broadcast or radio); id. § 110(10) (exempting 
performances of nondramatic literary or musical works “in the course of a social function 
which is organized and promoted by a nonprofit veterans’ organization or a nonprofit 
fraternal organization to which the general public is not invited” if the proceeds are used for 
charitable purposes).  To be sure, other provisions of section 110, applying to personal users, 
are somewhat broader. See, e.g., id. § 110 (5)(A). 
 33. See id. §§ 108–22. 
 34. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 35. Id. at 124 (“[T]he RS-DVR allows Cablevision customers who do not have a stand-
alone DVR to record cable programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by 
Cablevision at a ‘remote’ location.”).  They did so even though consumer experience of the 
service resembled that provided by home-based DVRs like TiVO, which, in turn, arguably 
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Cablevision convinced the Second Circuit that it was not making “copies” 
under the statute when the DVR copies were made at consumer direction.36  
That did not exhaust the claims against it, however, as the copyright 
plaintiffs also claimed a violation of their reproduction rights (because of 
transient cache copies made by Cablevision) and their performance right 
(arising when Cablevision transmitted the consumer-saved copies back to 
its customers).  Though both claims failed as well,37 they highlight the 
statute’s potential to take away with one provision what it gives with 
another.38  In a similar vein, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) purports to preserve fair use rights, but makes illegal distributing 
tools used to circumvent technological access controls even if the purpose is 
to facilitate fair use.39  Ripping a DVD to create a backup copy may be fair 
use, but the right means little if Congress prohibits commerce in the 
necessary tools.40 
These features of the Copyright Act have been criticized for being 
unresponsive to technological change while creating barriers to entry for 
new technologies.41  But the deeper problem is that Congress’s disparate 
treatment of copyright holders and copyright users gives courts more 
leeway to expand copyright rights than to constrain them.42  The copyright 
statute inconsistently mixes delegating and non-delegating language.43  Its 
broad provisions cannot be applied without judicial interpretation of their 
 
resemble the VCR approved by the Supreme Court in Sony, but the fair use issue was off the 
table as was a theory of contributory infringement. Id. 
 36. Id. at 133 (“[C]opies produced by the RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR 
customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction by providing the system does 
not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”). 
 37. Id. at 130 (“[W]orks in this case are embodied in the buffer for only a ‘transitory’ 
period, thus failing the duration requirement.”); id. at 139 (“Because each RS-DVR playback 
transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that 
subscriber, we conclude that such transmissions are not performances ‘to the public,’ and 
therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public performance.”). 
 38. Cf. id. at 134 (“[W]e note that our conclusion . . . that the customer, not Cablevision, 
‘does’ the copying does not dictate a parallel conclusion that the customer, and not 
Cablevision, ‘performs’ the copyrighted work.”); see also David Nimmer, Brains and Other 
Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (1996).  Current litigation 
over the sale of ringtones is another example of attempts to leverage the Copyright Act’s 
multiplicity of rights. See generally In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (rejecting argument that distribution of ringtones to customers results in a public 
performance requiring licensing fees).  This multiplicity, moreover, creates significant 
licensing issues when the various copyright rights are fragmented among multiple owners. 
 39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 40. See generally Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting preliminary injunction against distribution of DVD copying 
software). 
 41. See, e.g., Endangered Gizmos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://w2.eff.org/endangered 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 42. I have argued elsewhere that a similar problem exists in trademark law under the 
Lanham Act. See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think:  Trademark 
Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 903–24 (2009). 
 43. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:8 (2009). 
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proper scope, inviting effective “common law development,” and potential 
expansion, by the courts.44  Countervailing provisions, again with the 
exception of fair use,45 are written with language that is not similarly open 
to adaptive judicial interpretation.  These choices have ramifications for 
judges independent of their view of the relative merits of strong 
copyrights.46  Courts may or may not accept the invitation of copyright 
plaintiffs to construe the Act expansively, but they have fewer doctrinal 
levers with which to aid defendants. 
b. Judicial Interpretations 
A Copyright Act susceptible to broad interpretation is necessary but not 
sufficient for broad copyright law.  Judges must accept the invitation of the 
statute’s open text to provide a liberal interpretation of copyright rights.47  
Many have. 
Courts have liberally interpreted the various exclusive rights given 
copyright holders by section 106.  Thus, the mere loading of a computer 
program from a disk into temporary memory for purposes of operating the 
machine is a reproduction.48  Gluing purchased prints onto tiles may be a 
derivative work.49  The ability to distribute a copyrighted work may 
substitute at trial for evidence of actual distribution.50  In contrast, judges 
are sometimes miserly in interpreting copyright exclusions.51  Other courts 
 
 44. Pierre N. Leval, Trademark:  Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
187, 198 (2004). 
 45. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 46. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Sometimes Congress specifies values or ends, 
things for the executive and judicial branches to achieve, but often it specifies means, 
creating loopholes but greater certainty.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 533, 546–47 (1983) (arguing that courts must respect legislative choices with 
respect to “creating or withholding gap-filling authority”). 
 47. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 596 (“Thirty years ago, an assertion that copyright law 
gave the copyright owner the exclusive right to ‘use’ its copyrighted work would have been 
dismissed as an obvious misunderstanding.  Recently, it’s become almost respectable as a 
description of the rights copyright owners do control, or should.” (citing ALAN LATMAN, 
STUDY NO. 14:  FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT 
SOCIETY OF THE USA, STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (1963))). 
 48. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a copy is created for purposes of the Copyright Act when a program is loaded 
from a disc into a computer’s RAM in order to operate the program). 
 49. See supra note 28. 
 50. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th Cir. 
1997) (stating that “[w]hen a public library adds a work to its collection, lists the work in its 
index or catalog system, and makes the work available to the borrowing or browsing public, 
it has completed all the steps necessary for distribution to the public” even if no evidence of 
public use exists).  The music industry has made similar arguments in pursuing defendants 
who have uploaded music files into the “shared” folder of file sharing programs, but where 
evidence is lacking of actual copies made as a result. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 595 n.59. 
 51. For example, the Third Circuit found a “public” performance where a video store 
made available to customers private booths for viewing rented cassettes. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63–64 (3d Cir. 1986).  Interpretation of the DMCA 
is another example.  The statute provides that it shall not be construed to limit fair use rights. 
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see the scope of the commercial monopoly granted by the copyright statute 
as a broad one, affecting their interpretation of fair use claims.52  Indeed, 
the specificity of copyright’s exclusions may be used to broaden the scope 
of rights granted in section 106.53 
The pattern of rulings in favor of strong copyright rights is not uniform,54 
and copyright should not be defined by its most extreme judicial 
interpretations.  But legal uncertainty has a similar effect on potential 
defendants as a more uniformly extreme view.55  Moreover, the 
rights/restriction mismatch created by the statute allows judicial 
interpretation to function as a ratchet in favor of strong copyrights.  Courts 
do not always adopt the broadest possible view of copyrights, but statutory 
language makes them better copyright expansionists than restrictionists.  
For good or ill, Congress is the one that has placed a thumb on the scale, 
and the courts have balanced predictably. 
2.  Increasing Collisions Between Norms and Law 
Modern copyright law does not want for critics.  Some ask fundamental 
questions of whether copyright really “promote[s] the progress” of 
authorship or is mere rent seeking.56  Others focus on burdens to expressive 
or other interests of users of copyrighted content.57  Nestled in this latter 
 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006).  Some courts have nonetheless concluded that the statute’s 
protection of “access-control” measures do not run afoul of that limitation, even if the 
purpose of the circumvention is the exercise of fair use rights.  Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 443 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[1201(c)(1)] simply clarifies that the DMCA 
targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in 
circumvention tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after 
circumvention has occurred.”); id. at 459 (“Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of 
access to copyrighted material in order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred technique or in 
the format of the original.”). 
 52. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1913–14 (“If any use that allows a person to 
get for free something she would otherwise need to pay for is a commercial one . . . then 
most lawful unlicensed uses would be commercial.”). 
 53. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–805 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(interpreting the Copyright Act’s limitation on the scope of the sound recording copyright as 
a reason for giving owner of a sound recording copyright the exclusive right to sample the 
work). 
 54. See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (concluding cable company operator of off-site DVRs was not directly liable for 
creation of copies ordered by customers because “volitional conduct is an important element 
of direct liability”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009). 
 55. See, e.g., James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property 
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 887–95 (2007). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see, e.g., MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, 
AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7 (2008).  Copyright skepticism predates the 1976 Act. 
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 284 (1970) (“Taken as a 
whole, the evidence now available suggests that, although we should hesitate to abolish 
copyright protection, we should equally hesitate to extend or strengthen it.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay:  How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
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critique is the positive observation that the world of rights set forth under 
current copyright doctrine bears only a tangential relationship with the way 
content users live their lives.  Regardless of what the lawyers say, blithe 
copyright infringements fill our daily lives.58 
To this claim, one might ask, “So what?”  After all, most of these 
infringements go unnoticed, let alone litigated.  And it is true that rights 
holders are unlikely to pursue the broadest possible copyright claims 
against individual users.59  Such litigation may be a financial loser,60 
provoke a public backlash, or face unsympathetic judges who may balk at 
extreme claims, even if the reason for balking is unclear.61 
Even so, the current mismatch between norms and law is problematic.  It 
might sow disregard for provisions of the copyright statute that would 
otherwise be perceived as legitimate, or, worse, undermine the rule of law 
in general.  More pragmatically, even underenforced law may deter users 
who wish to engage in socially beneficial activities, but fear potential 
litigation.  The law/norm mismatch also feeds the impression that certain 
copyright uses, which arguably should be (or are) legal, exist only as the 
product of benevolence on the part of rights holders.  For many copyright 
critics, this impression is precisely the problem.62  After all, when the rights 
holder claims, “This is infringing, but I’ll let it go,” the consumer lacks the 
 
 58. See Tehranian, supra note 5, at 543–48. 
 59. Though it bears noting that the RIAA’s litigation campaign targeted a large number 
of downloaders. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People . . . or 35,000?, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 8, 2009, 2:50 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/has-
the-riaa-sued-18000-people-or-35000.ars.  And sometimes the wrong target is hit. See, e.g., 
Nate Anderson, Using Faulty Data to Demand Settlements from Innocent Surfers, ARS 
TECHNICA (Nov. 30, 2009, 7:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/
11/using-faulty-data-to-demand-settlements-from-innocent-surfers.ars. 
 60. Steven Marks, RIAA Responds:  Nesson More like P.T. Barnum than David, ARS 
TECHNICA (May 31, 2009, 11:30 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/riaa-
responds.ars (op-ed by Recording Industry Association of America general counsel arguing 
that litigation against file sharers has lost money). But see Nate Anderson, The RIAA? 
Amateurs.  Here’s How You Sue 14,000+ P2P Users, ARS TECHNICA, 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/06/the-riaa-amateurs-heres-how-you-sue-p2p-
users.ars (last updated June 2010) (describing pursuit of copyright litigation as business 
model of “the US Copyright Group, a set of lawyers who have turned P2P prosecution into 
revenue generation”). 
 61. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.  And, of course, rights holders have an 
incentive to resist litigation declaring a user’s rights ex ante. See, e.g., Shloss v. Sweeney, 
515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1080–82 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting copyright holder’s motion to 
dismiss author’s action seeking declaratory judgment that planned use of copyrighted 
materials would be legal); Edelman v. N2H2, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 137, 137–39 (D. Mass. 
2003) (holding that plaintiff who sought declaration of right to reverse engineer Internet 
blocking software lacked standing). 
 62. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1920 (arguing that even if 
unenforced, an expansive view of the statute is distortive because it “encourages copyright 
owners to expect too much, and . . . . snookers judges into reinterpreting the language of the 
statute to give effect to the perceived intent of Congress, expanding copies to include RAM 
copies, and commercial uses to include any use a copyright owner might otherwise charge 
for” (footnotes omitted)). 
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incentive or ability to mount a vigorous defense.  The cumulative effect of 
such assertions, however, may distort copyright policy. 
Perhaps the greatest danger of the tolerated use approach is that it aids 
efforts to use copyright law to control technologies that may be used to 
“infringe.”  This is not a new problem,63 but litigation continues over the 
extent to which the providers of technological tools may be liable for the 
purported infringing activities of their customers.64  And the argument that 
the public engages in a vast amount of infringement shapes public debate 
over technology policy.65  Providers of technologies used to interact with 
copyrighted materials who want to avoid charges of aiding infringement 
face pressure to limit their products’ availability or functionality,66 or to 
introduce anti-piracy technologies that raise technical or privacy concerns.67 
3.  The Problem of Personal Use 
Copyright presents particular problems with respect to personal uses of 
copyrighted material.  As the online world continues to expand, everyday 
activities are more likely to implicate the copyright statute because so many 
interactions with digital content might constitute an unauthorized 
“reproduc[tion],”68 “performance,”69 or “display”70 of a copyrighted work 
and because so many digital technologies rely on copying for their 
 
 63. See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
 64. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 
1100–04 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Endangered Gizmos, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., 
http://w2.eff.org/endangered/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2010).  Most prominently, YouTube is in 
litigation with copyright holders as to whether it does enough to prevent the uploading of 
infringing content. 
 65. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 705–08 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (striking 
down FCC’s broadcast flag regulation); Matthew Lasar, Warner Video Shows Hollywood 
Doesn’t Need HDTV Blocking, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 5, 2009, 2:11 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/11/warner-video-shows-hollywood-doesnt-need-
hdtv-blocking.ars (describing movie industry efforts to obtain authority to block analog 
outputs of home electronic devices). 
 66. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, Schools Take Wait-and-See Approach After Ohio U Bans 
P2P Traffic, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2007, 12:31 AM),  http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2007/04/schools-take-wait-and-see-approach-after-ohio-u-bans-p2p-traffic.ars 
(reporting on Ohio State University’s decision to ban file sharing programs after RIAA 
identified the school as a leading site for copyright infringement). 
 67. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Deep Packet Inspection Under Assault over Privacy 
Concerns, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2008, 1:03 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/05/deep-packet-inspection-under-assault-from-
canadian-critics.ars (discussing privacy and net neutrality concerns surrounding deep packet 
inspection technology). 
 68. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a copy is created for purposes of the Copyright Act when a program is loaded 
from a disc into a computer’s RAM in order to operate the program). 
 69. See, e.g., Live Nation Motor Sports, Inc. v. Davis, No. 3:06-CV-276-L, 2007 WL 
79311, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2007) (finding violation of performance right where 
defendant provided an “unauthorized ‘link’ to . . . live webcasts”). 
 70. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159–62 (9th Cir. 
2007) (discussing display right in Internet context). 
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operation.  Copying is not only more likely online; it is more detectable and 
traceable.71  And technological controls like digital rights management 
create the potential for greater use of metering arrangements.  That is, 
content providers may license their works for single uses rather than 
providing copies for repeated reading or other consumption by the 
purchaser.  Whatever the merits of such efforts, they have the potential to 
run counter to consumer expectations.72 
Setting aside debates over the harm done by modern technology to the 
core markets of copyright holders and the proper policy response,73 many 
modern personal uses are the sort that were traditionally not the concern of 
copyright law.  Children who once would have played Batman in the 
schoolyard may now create Batman-like avatars online, provoking litigation 
against the providers of the digital playground.74  Broad interpretations of 
copyright law now endanger interactions with copyrighted material that 
never posed a legal problem in the past, upsetting the previous balance of 
interests between copyright creators and users.  As noted above, even if 
actual suits against individual consumers are rare, the legal characterization 
of personal uses as infringing but for copyright holder indulgence has 
ramifications for the ability to create tools that may be used to interact with 
the digital world more generally.75 
 
 71. The DMCA provides procedures for a copyright holder to obtain a subpoena to force 
an Internet Service Provider to give identifying information regarding alleged infringers. 17 
U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006).  And the music industry has used services that connect to peer-to-
peer networks to search for Internet Protocol addresses of the hosts of protected material.  
These addresses then become the basis of subpoenas. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Thomas 
Judge Bars Fair Use Defense, OKs MediaSentry Evidence, ARS TECHNICA (June 11, 2009, 
5:12 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/thomas-judge-bars-fair-use-
defense-oks-mediasentry-evidence.ars; Nate Anderson, MediaSentry Weighed in the 
Balance, Found Wanting, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 5, 2009, 5:25 AM), http://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/news/2009/03/mediasentry-weighed-in-the-balance-found-wanting.ars; Eric 
Bangeman, Marshall University Fails to Block RIAA’s P2P Subpoenas, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 
16, 2008, 7:15 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/04/marshall-university-
fails-to-block-riaas-p2p-subpoenas.ars. 
 72. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, DirecTV DVR Clampdown:  A Sober Reminder of DRM 
Suckitude, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 20, 2008, 8:27 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/03/directv-dvr-clampdown-a-sober-reminder-of-
drm-suckitude.ars (reporting that subscribers to DVR service were advised that functionality 
of DVRs would be compromised so that recorded pay-per-view movies would become 
unwatchable after twenty-four hours). 
 73. See, e.g., Nate Anderson, “Fair Use” Generates Trillions in the US Alone, ARS 
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/04/fair-use-generates-trillions-in-
the-us-alone.ars (last updated April 2010); Julian Sanchez, 750,000 Lost Jobs?  The Dodgy 
Digits Behind the War on Piracy, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 7, 2008, 11:30 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/10/dodgy-digits-behind-the-war-on-piracy.ars. 
 74. See Marvel Enters., Inc. v. NCSoft Corp., No. CV 04-9253RGKPLAX, 2005 WL 
878090, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2005) (litigation over computer game allowing users to 
create and play with superhero characters that alleged that resulting characters infringed 
copyrights).  This is not to say that kids shouldn’t get out more. 
 75. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1877 (cautioning that after its victory 
over Grokster, the record industry increased efforts to halt CD burning while “both the 
motion picture industry and the recording industry seek laws requiring consumer electronics 
companies to incorporate copy prevention technology into digital televisions and radios. 
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Although traditional conceptions of copyright law carved space for 
personal uses,76 these openings have not kept pace with evolving doctrine.  
Today, many commonplace personal uses appear to be legally questionable 
notwithstanding their routine quality.77   
B.  Reform Difficulties 
Addressing the problems identified by the last section through the courts 
is difficult.  First, as currently applied, the fair use doctrine is unlikely to 
live up to the promise of the breadth of its language.  Second, the Copyright 
Act’s mismatch between copyright rights and limitations is a fact of text 
that judges implementing the Copyright Act cannot ignore.78 
1.  The Limitations of Fair Use 
The fair use doctrine appears to provide precisely the sort of open pro-
defendant statutory language that the Copyright Act otherwise lacks.  Fair 
use shields certain uses of copyrighted material even when they nominally 
fall under the scope of the exclusive rights granted by section 106.79  
Congress codified fair use, which had been a judicial creation, in its 1976 
copyright revision.80  The term nonetheless remains undefined; the statutory 
factors, imprecise.  This vagueness was deliberate, as Congress intended 
 
Thus, the effort to capture control over personal uses is moving further and further into 
consumers’ homes.”). 
 76. See id. at 1883–93 (describing cases protecting user copyright liberties). 
 77. Id. at 1872 (“Every time a study of copyright law queries the scope of lawful 
personal use, it concludes that the answer to the question whether any particular personal use 
is lawful is indeterminate.”); id. at 1897–98 (describing routine personal uses in which 
author and her circle engage and noting their ambiguous legal status). 
 78. A third possibility, invoking the First Amendment, is difficult insofar as the Supreme 
Court has generally taken the view that the fair use doctrine in conjunction with limitations 
on copyrightable subject matter provides a built-in safeguard against copyright’s intruding 
on free speech. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[W]hen . . . Congress has 
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny 
is unnecessary.”). But see Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1192–94 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that restoration of copyright in certain foreign works required First Amendment 
scrutiny); Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1090–94 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that 
restoration survives intermediate scrutiny). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5679 
(“Although the courts have considered and ruled upon the fair use doctrine over and over 
again, no real definition of the concept has ever emerged.  Indeed, since the doctrine is an 
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible . . . .”); see also 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (No. 4,901) (“This is 
one of those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in which it is not, from the peculiar 
nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to 
lay down any general principles applicable to all cases.”).  Calling the defense “equitable” 
raises some hackles. Compare Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (characterizing fair use as “entirely equitable”), with 4 PATRY, supra note 
43, § 10:3 (“Fair use is not an equitable doctrine or an equitable defense.  As history reveals, 
it is a legal defense which may, and frequently is, decided by a jury . . . .” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
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that courts continue the common law development of the doctrine that had 
preceded its codification.81 
Several aspects of fair use limit its ability to mitigate copyright’s 
expansion or provide clear protection for personal use.82  Most importantly, 
its unpredictability provides little ex ante certainty about its application.83  
The Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against looking to the 
doctrine for categorical rules, instead directing case-by-case application.84   
The ambiguity benefits copyright owners because courts treat fair use as 
an affirmative defense whose establishment is the defendant’s problem.85  
And personal uses that cannot be characterized as new authorship are not 
easily accommodated.  Several scholars note that copyright law tends to 
consider the merits of non-consumptive users through the restrictive prism 
 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680 (“[T]here is 
no disposition to freeze the doctrine . . . .  Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what 
fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the 
doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 82. “[I]f we limit our conversation to a room full of copyright lawyers and copyright 
scholars, fair use remains a doctrine that permits a relatively narrow swathe of exceptional, 
rather than everyday, uses.” Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590–91. 
 83. The divergence of scholarly opinion over the legality of artist Shepherd Fairey’s use 
of an AP photo as raw material for the iconic Barack Obama “Hope” poster nicely illustrates 
fair use’s uncertainty. See generally Dave Fagundes, Art, Licensing Markets, and the Limits 
of Unauthorized Appropriation, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 23, 2009), http://prawfsblawg. 
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/art-licensing-markets-and-the-limits-of-unauthorized-
appropriation-shepard-fairey-conversation-at-th.html (blog post detailing conflicting 
opinions of various law professors).  The frequent uncertainty raised by assertions of fair use 
rights supports Lawrence Lessig’s quip describing fair use as little more than “the right to 
hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG 
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY 187 (2004). 
 84. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (“The task is not to 
be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for 
case-by-case analysis.” (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 560 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 
& n.31 (1984); 1976 Copyright Act’s legislative history)).  To be fair, ’twas ever thus. 
Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344 (“This is one of those intricate and embarrassing questions . . . in 
which it is not, from the peculiar nature and character of the controversy, easy to arrive at 
any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases.”). 
  The Supreme Court did hold in Sony that recording television in order to “time-shift” 
program viewing was fair. Sony, 464 U.S. at 455–56.  Some express doubt, however, that the 
case would be decided the same way today. Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590 (“In the 
question-and-answer session following Paul Goldstein’s keynote speech at this symposium, 
an audience member asked whether Sony would be decided the same way today.  Professor 
Goldstein was confident that it would not, and nobody in the audience took issue with his 
conclusion.”).  And some opinions contain suggestions to the same effect. In re Aimster 
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing use of a recording 
device to skip commercials as the creation of an unauthorized derivative work). 
 85. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper, 471 U.S. at 561.  One could read section 107 as 
placing the burden of demonstrating that the challenged use is not fair on the plaintiff. 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use 
of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).  That’s not the way the 
Supreme Court sees it. 
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of authorship.86  This view treats the user as another author who builds on 
prior works.  In this conception, courts balance an author’s interest in a 
strong copyright against her need for access to a public domain that fuels 
further creativity.87  But copying can serve interests—such as autonomy 
and non-authorial self-expression—that extend beyond fodder for fresh 
authorship.88  Modern fair use doctrine has relatively little to say about such 
uses.89 
2.  The Matter of the Text 
Fair use’s shortcomings have not curbed academic enthusiasm for 
judicial intervention to curtail copyright’s scope.  But if fair use is at least 
partially off the table, what can judges do?90 
The question implicates larger debates over the proper judicial role in 
statutory interpretation.  Jessica Litman objects that copyright scholars have 
abetted copyright’s expansion by uncritically accepting a view of the 
Copyright Act as nominally giving rights holders all that they might want.  
An unduly literalist view of the statute leads to an almost perverse delight at 
the extremity of the resulting conclusions.91 
 
 86. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 405 
(2003). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 406–20; Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2005); Tushnet, supra note 57, at 562–82. 
 89. Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 177 (2007) 
(“Fair use is much too busy protecting The Wind Done Gone and trying to figure out what to 
do with Google Book Search to be able to support the copyright interests of millions of 
everyday readers, listeners, and viewers.”). 
 90. Professor Litman proposes a range of options while favoring a focus on what 
Congress intended to be understood about its enacted rights: 
  An individual who rips a CD to her iPod, turns on her brother’s computer, fast 
forwards through objectionable portions of a television show or DVD, or plays 
music with the windows open isn’t violating the copyright law, despite the plain 
language of § 106.  People disagree on the rationale.  It might be fair use; it might 
be implicitly licensed by copyright owners; it might be that the harm caused by 
each consumer is de minimis, or it might be, as I argue, that Congress intended the 
§ 106 rights to be interpreted subject to the understanding that copyright prohibits 
unauthorized exploitation but not unauthorized enjoyment. 
Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1908 (footnote omitted).  In a sense, the 
argument favored by this Article parallels this final comment, but seeks to doctrinally ground 
it in the common law of property and Congress’s failure to explicitly override it. See infra 
Part III.A. 
 91. Professor Litman states: 
Section 106 means what it says, we tell our students.  Any reproduction, creative 
alteration, or distribution, any performance or display outside of the home, we tell 
them, is copyright infringement unless it comes within some statutory or judge-
made exception.  We are even kind of gleeful at the implausible results that follow 
from the premise.  “That’s how the statute sets things up,” we say, as if our hands 
were tied. 
Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 180; cf. id. at 181 (“Copyright owners . . . have 
seized on the expansive literal reading and made it their own.  Some courts are enforcing it, 
and copyright scholars are questioning it only faintly and half-heartedly.”). 
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It may well be true that courts have run with the Copyright Act’s 
language in a manner that the drafters of the 1976 Act never 
contemplated,92 but that is hardly a litigation trump if courts do not care 
about legislative history, at least where textual signposts are roughly 
discernable.93  This is especially so if we are in a jurisprudential moment 
that elevates textualist methods of interpreting statutes at the expense of 
alternative tools of construction, particularly those that seek to recapture the 
intentions of Congress and implement the legislature’s purpose.94  This 
characterization is debatable, both generally and in copyright case law in 
particular.95  And in any case, statutes contain many ambiguous or vague 
terms that require judicial construction, opening the door to pragmatic 
considerations.96 
 
 92. See, e.g., id. at 180; Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1907 (“Congress 
has consistently viewed copyright as securing copyright owners’ opportunities to exploit 
works without invading individuals’ liberties to enjoy works.”). 
 93. For example, Professor Litman notes that Congress intended the Audio Home 
Recording Act to give consumers a “free pass to make any copies of recorded music that 
technology would allow.”  Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 590 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-
873(I), at 24 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3578, 3594; William F. Patry, Section 
1008, PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Aug. 17, 2005, 9:44 AM), 
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2005/08/section-1008.html).  In isolation, the provision 
looked to have done the job.  Section 1008 provides: 
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based 
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, 
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog 
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a 
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical 
recordings. 
17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006).  Unfortunately, the statute elsewhere gives restrictive definitions of 
“digital audio recording device” and “digital audio recording medium” so as to limit the 
exemption provided by the American Home Recording Act (AHRA) such that it does not 
apply to the vast majority of devices used to make digital music recordings. Id. § 1001.  For 
his part, Patry writes, “[O]ur subjective intention and that of the Committee, expressed in the 
Committee report, was to exempt all noncommercial private copying.  Because we failed to 
express that intention in the statute, I accept that our intention is irrelevant.” Patry, supra. 
  As Professor Litman notes, judicial neglect of Congress’s intent applied not only to 
section 1008, but to attempts to appeal to the animating principle in the fair use context.  
“Eight years [after the AHRA], Napster sought to make precisely those arguments:  that 
consumer copying of recorded music was either fair use under Sony, permissible under the 
Audio Home Recording Act, or both.  The court didn’t think the arguments merited serious 
consideration, and resolved them against Napster summarily.” Litman, Goo, supra note 6, at 
590 (footnotes omitted). 
 94. See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 42, at 929 n.152 (collecting sources).  To say that 
there may be a greater reliance on textualist methodology is not to say that other 
considerations do not continue to inform statutory interpretation. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 158 (2009). 
 95. See 1 PATRY, supra note 43, § 2:37 (collecting examples of legislative history use in 
copyright cases and contending that “[r]egardless of the polemical effect of Justice Scalia’s 
attacks on legislative history, an empirical study of the use of legislative history in copyright 
cases demonstrates that Justice Scalia’s criticism has had no discernible effect”). 
 96. See, e.g., Leval, supra note 44, at 196-98 (discussing delegating and non-delegating 
statutes). 
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But sometimes Congress speaks clearly.  It is the textual mismatch 
between those statutory provisions that expand copyright’s scope and those 
that limit it that creates the most mischief.97  Textual checks to copyright—
fair use aside—lack the openness of those terms that empower copyright 
holders.  Courts may be mistaken to equate the loading of software from a 
disc with an actionable reproduction,98 but the breadth of the Copyright 
Act’s definition of “copies” makes it hard to claim that they are usurping 
Congress’s authority.99  Copyright restrictionists may not lose every battle, 
and perhaps a good deal remains up for grabs, but the statute’s broad scope 
requires them constantly to play defense. 
Opportunities for offense are more limited.  Restrictive doctrines need 
some legal basis.  If fair use is limited, then those who would craft doctrines 
to limit copyright are at a disadvantage.  It is well and good to argue that 
non-commercial use of music should be legal as a matter of policy, 
legislative intent, or the underlying purposes of copyright.100  But it is a 
good deal harder to claim that it is legal.  In light of the specificity of the 
statute’s textual exclusions, courts appear to have scant room to 
improvise.101 
C.  The Promise and Limitations of Implied Licenses 
In response to the problems of fair use, some copyright restrictionists 
suggest expanding the use of implied licenses.  This approach’s promise is 
limited by the doctrine’s strong focus on copyright holder conduct.  It is too 
easy for copyright holders to “revoke” any implied license. 
1.  Implied Licenses Generally 
Implied licenses traditionally fill gaps in contracts where the failure to 
accommodate copyright’s peculiarities might deprive a party of the benefit 
of her bargain.102  A copyright is distinct from the object that embodies the 
 
 97. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 98. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 99. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining copy as a material object “in which a work is fixed 
by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device”). 
 100. See supra note 93. 
 101. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 367 (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) 
(noting that “some scholars, myself included, have suggested that it might be a good idea     
if . . . courts were permitted to read the law according to what they perceived to be the will 
of the current Congress, rather than that of a long-gone-by one,” but conceding that “such an 
arrangement in the abstract . . . is simply not a part of our legal system” (citing GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982))). 
 102. Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License:  An Emerging New Standard in Copyright 
Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 276–77 (2009) (commenting that 
in copyright law, implied license resolves “two conflicts:  the tension between the owner of a 
tangible object in which a work is incorporated and the owner of the copyright for that work, 
and the tension between the creator of a work (and/or the copyright owner) and his or her 
transferee (e.g., the work’s commissioner)”). 
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protected expression, and copyright transfers must satisfy a federal statute 
of frauds.103  This complicates transactions for the careless and unaware.  A 
movie producer might commission copyrighted material for inclusion in a 
film, but neglect to obtain a written transfer of copyright or secure a work-
made-for-hire agreement.104  In response, a court may imply a license to use 
the work to implement the intention of the parties.105 
Courts also use implied licenses to vindicate reasonable consumer 
expectations.106  Implied license enables the purchaser to use his purchase 
in a reasonable manner even if the use necessitates treading upon a 
protected copyright right.107 
These two patterns characterize the bulk of implied license cases.108  In 
both, the implied license can be found in the intent of the copyright owner, 
and that is where the doctrine focuses its attention.109 
Several commentators recommend broadened reliance on implied 
licenses as a means of harmonizing copyright doctrine with user norms.110  
Some of these recommendations apply traditional implied license reasoning 
to the Internet context.  They focus on the reasonable implications of direct 
interaction between the copyright holder and the “licensee.”111  Others are 
 
 103. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights 
under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is 
embodied.”); id. § 204 (“A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, 
is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is 
in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized 
agent.”). 
 104. Id. § 101 (defining work made for hire); id. § 201(b) (vesting copyright ownership in 
employer for works made for hire). 
 105. See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
copyright holder’s creation and delivery of work at request of moviemaker constituted an 
implied license for use of the work in defendant’s film); 2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131. 
 106. Many such expectations have since been protected by statute.  The traditional first-
sale doctrine, codified by the 1909 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1909) (repealed 1976), preserved the 
ability of purchasers of copyrighted works to “sell or otherwise dispose” of them. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 109; see 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:19. 
 107. For example, the sale of a computer program may carry with it a license to copy its 
contents into the computer (rather than simply running the program off of a CD).  As Patry 
explains: 
[P]urchasing a used CD cannot be deemed to convey an implied license for 
reproduction.  By contrast, sale and purchase of a computer program does convey 
an implied license for internal reproduction because the purpose of the program is 
use in a computer, a use that necessitates the making of a copy (at least during 
installation, and likely repeatedly thereafter in RAM storage), a right reserved to 
copyright owners. 
2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
 108. See Afori, supra note 102, at 281. 
 109. 2 PATRY, supra note 43, § 5:131 (“Under the classic implied license, the author 
actually creates the work for the defendant, intending the defendant to use the work . . . .”). 
 110. See, e.g., Afori, supra note 102, at 290; Raghu Seshadri, Bridging the Digital 
Divide:  How the Implied License Doctrine Could Narrow the Copynorm-Copyright Gap, 
2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3; John S. Sieman, Comment, Using the Implied License to Inject 
Common Sense Into Digital Copyright, 85 N.C. L. REV. 885, 921 (2007). 
 111. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 38, at 20 (“By virtue of the business transaction that 
led to ownership of the CD-ROM, the buyer of Nimmer on Copyright has an implicit license 
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more ambitious and suggest that implied licenses can bridge the gap 
separating copyright practices from the norms that have evolved among 
users.112 
2.  The Limitations of Implied License 
These latter proposals may falter when faced with transactions outside 
the bilateral setting of traditional implied license doctrine.113  Sometimes 
non-face-to-face transactions may be akin to traditional cases.  For example, 
an Internet user may reasonably assume that a website’s public status 
conveys a license to engage in copying activities that are necessary to view 
it.114  But what if such assent cannot be inferred or is explicitly withheld? 
The primary problem with increased reliance on implied licenses is the 
doctrine’s focus on licensor intent.  The potential of implied licenses is 
limited indeed if a copyright owner can negate any prospective license 
simply by affixing a notice that prohibits duplication.  But that’s what 
current precedent suggests.115 
Recognizing the problem, Orit Fischman Afori proposes removing 
implied license from its contractual roots. 
Once the doctrine is fully acknowledged as a pure judicial standard for 
infusing reasonableness into intellectual property law without the need to 
track the subjective or even the objective intent of the copyright owner, it 
will pave the way for the emergence of an implied license doctrine as a 
key principle of intellectual property law. 116 
In calling for implied licenses to inject a reasonableness criterion into 
copyright, Professor Afori notes that most discussions of broadening the 
role of implied license in copyright doctrine have hewn to a traditional 
contractual framework.117  And for good reason.  Reliance on traditional 
contract law principles gives implied license a legal basis.  Abandoning that 
framework leaves proponents with a legitimacy difficulty. 
Professor Afori’s response is to treat the term “implied license” as a 
starting point that may then be elaborated into a “pure judicial standard for 
infusing reasonableness” through common law decision making that treats 
 
to boot up; Jolly Roger does not.”); id. at 32 (suggesting similar reasoning for forwarded e-
mail). 
 112. Seshadri, supra note 110, at 30, ¶ 59. 
 113. Cf. Janis, supra note 2, at 499–500 (discussing implied licenses of intellectual 
property in bilateral settings). 
 114. See, e.g., id. at 501 n.460. 
 115. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“Courts have found implied licenses only in ‘narrow’ circumstances where one party 
‘created a work at [the other’s] request and handed it over, intending that [the other] copy 
and distribute it.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). 
 116. Afori, supra note 102, at 290. 
 117. Id. (“To date, however, the few scholars who have focused on the potential of the 
implied license doctrine as a means to resolve many of the current problems in copyright 
law, especially in the context of the Internet, have stuck to the doctrine’s traditional 
contractual framework.”). 
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the phrase “implied license” as a metaphor.118  This begs the question, 
discussed above, of whether courts have the authority to engage in such 
flights of creativity.119 
Implied licenses face another difficulty.  A copyright holder’s ability to 
revoke licenses reintroduces the problem of tolerated use.120  Treating 
certain uses as tolerated reinforces the perception that copyright holders can 
(and should) control how users employ the works.121  What is needed is a 
basis for the doctrine that is not wholly dependent on the rights holder’s 
behavior.  Traditional conceptions of implied licenses cannot play this 
role.122 
II.  PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW BASELINE 
There is another basis for protecting personal use, but the Copyright Act 
is the wrong place to look.  Copyright law—and intellectual property law 
generally—operates by interfering with common law property rights.  
Though this observation is the basis of several critiques of intellectual 
property regimes, there have been relatively few efforts to integrate it into 
copyright doctrine.  The first step is to appreciate that user property rights 
in the tools used to interact with copyrighted material are part of the 
common law baseline that copyright law alters.  Judges often note that 
courts should interpret statutes in harmony with the preexisting common 
law absent clear legislative text to the contrary.  This truth has been used to 
 
 118. Id. at 290; id. at 295 (“Why, then, use the term ‘implied license,’ which clearly 
indicates a contractual concept?  One way of answering this question is to regard the 
introduction of the implied license doctrine into copyright law as a metaphor.”); id. at 297 
(“[T]raditional use of the implied license doctrine was to infuse reasonableness into 
intellectual property law when the contractual framework enabled it.  Thus, an almost natural 
evolution of this doctrine would be to keep its aim, tradition and terminology, despite 
moving it out of the contractual framework.”). 
 119. See supra Part I.B.  Professor Afori analogizes her approach to what courts have 
done with certain open terms in the statute. Afori, supra note 102, at 298–99.  But those 
terms have the benefit of actually being in the statute.  Professor Afori contends that implied 
license doctrine is nonetheless legitimate because the concept is already a part of copyright. 
Id. at 299 (“The proposed new meaning of the implied license doctrine fits the existing 
pattern of evolution in copyright terminology described above, since it builds on an already 
existing copyright term which is still not fully or clearly defined.”).  That may be, but in its 
traditional conception the doctrine has plausible legal bases in traditional contract and 
licensing principles.  If detached from that foundation, as Professor Afori proposes, 
something new is needed if the revised doctrine is to stand. 
 120. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 121. Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 179 (“Relying on implied license to 
permit fan fiction and fan video reinforces the obvious negative pregnant:  if it is not the sort 
of thing copyright owners have a clear interest in permitting, copyright law should not allow 
it.”). 
 122. Id. at 178 (“[W]e could treat fannish creations as implicitly authorized derivative 
works.  The implicit authorization flows from releasing a work in the mass media for which 
the buzz generated by fannish activity is likely to mean a huge increase in the bottom         
line . . . .”).  Professor Litman notes that this view would not “undermin[e] the core 
understanding that the copyright owner is entitled to decide whether or not to allow fans to 
engage in creative embroidery.” Id. 
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expand copyright’s scope,123 but it has not penetrated judicial or scholarly 
analysis of the potential of implied licenses. 
Reading the Copyright Act against the backdrop of preexisting property 
rights of copyright users provides a basis for weaving these rights—and the 
longstanding norms that they reinforce—into the fabric of copyright law.  
First, personal property rights may form the basis of a limiting construction 
for the Copyright Act.  Second, the common law baseline may serve as a 
source for rules needed to fill gaps in the statute.   
A.  Intellectual Property as Property Regulation 
Copyright’s growth has been described as the transformation of a limited 
commercial monopoly into a broader property right.124  One finds similar 
characterizations in the debate about whether intellectual property is 
“property” despite the many differences separating real and personal 
property from IP.125  My focus is less on the question whether IP, 
specifically copyright, is property and more on the effect of intellectual 
property rights—whatever their claim to property status—on the property 
rights of others. 
To assume, arguendo or otherwise, that intellectual property is traditional 
property is to mask its extraordinary character.  While governments impose 
any number of regulations on our property, intellectual property laws give 
private actors regulatory power over the private property of others.  Holders 
of these “intellectual privileges” may invoke the coercive apparatus of the 
state to regulate private conduct.126  And unlike land easements or 
servitudes, these intrusions are not bargained for or otherwise avoidable.  
They exist as an intrusion into private property rights.  This observation has 
long formed part of the “moral” critique of intellectual property law,127 but 
it has broader implications for the question of user rights. 
 
 123. See infra Part II.E.3. 
 124. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in the New Millennium:  Resolving the 
Conflict Between Property Rights and Political Rights, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 707 (2001) 
(“Copyright, in short, has been changed from a marketing monopoly to a proprietary 
monopoly that gives the copyright holder as much control over a copyrighted work as the 
title to realty gives the titleholder over a plot of land.”). 
 125. For a canvass of these differences, see, for example, Bell, supra note 2, at 532–40. 
 126. See id. at 526–27 (“In particular, the Copyright Act entitles a copyright holder to 
enlist agents of the state in prima facie violations of non-owners’ rights.  Absent copyright, 
we would remain free to employ our persons and property in echo of others.  Copyright 
sharply limits those, our natural and common law rights.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 127. See, e.g., THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, 1 SPEECHES BY THE RT. HON. THOMAS 
BABINGTON MACAULAY, M.P. 394 (1853), available at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/
ABA0947.0001.001 (“The principle of copyright is this.  It is a tax on readers for the 
purpose of giving a bounty to writers.  The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one 
of the most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures . . . .”); Tom G. Palmer, Are 
Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?  The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal 
Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 865 (1990) (“[T]he attempt to generate profit 
opportunities by legislatively limiting access to certain ideal goods, and therefore to mimic 
the market processes governing the allocation of tangible goods, contains a fatal 
contradiction:  It violates the rights to tangible goods, the very rights that provide the legal 
 
2010] PROPERTY IS A TWO-WAY STREET 459 
B.  Three Objections 
Not everyone will agree that characterizing intellectual property as an 
interference with property (or liberty)128 is productive. 
1.  Doesn’t All Property Affect Property? 
The first objection is to dismiss the claim as banal.  Any property right or 
legal entitlement may be described as a check on the property of others.129  
Take the law of trespass, for example.  My freedom to aim my car 
anywhere I please ends at your property line. 
True enough.  But this example assumes that trespass is the proper 
analogy for intellectual property infringement.130  Not so. 
First, analogizing copyright infringement to trespass overlooks the 
impact of intellectual property’s protection of non-rivalrous matter.  
Intellectual property may be shared (trespassed upon) by many people at 
once without dispossessing anyone.  Giving the powers of property to the 
owners of non-rival goods radically expands the breadth of those powers 
and the number of people likely to be directly affected by their exercise.131  
 
foundations with which markets begin.”); Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: 
Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 862 
(1993) (“It sounds a lot less pleasant if, instead of saying we are rewarding authors, we turn 
the matter around and say we are imposing duties, restricting freedom, and inflicting burdens 
on certain individuals for the sake of the greater social good.”).  Of course, supporters of 
intellectual property rights also make normative claims alongside the utilitarian. See 
generally Palmer, supra (discussing normative claims in favor of intellectual property 
rights).  Others, while agreeing that there is a basis in natural rights arguments for the 
recognition of intellectual property rights, argue these same arguments counsel greater 
respect for the public’s interest in copying than generally appreciated. See Wendy J. Gordon, 
A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) (“When the limitations in natural 
law’s premises are taken seriously, natural rights not only cease to be a weapon against free 
expression; they also become a source of affirmative protection for free speech interests.”). 
 128. This Article focuses on IP’s consequences to property rights, not liberty interests.  
See infra note 211. 
 129. Cf., e.g., Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 719 (1917) (“If A owns and occupies Whiteacre, not only B 
but also a great many other persons . . . are under a duty, e. g., not to enter on A’s land.”); id. 
at 722 (“all rights in rem are against persons”). 
 130. Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (“The right to exclude 
others is generally one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property.  With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude others is central 
to the very definition of the property interest.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984) 
(“‘Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,’ that is, anyone 
who trespasses into his exclusive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted 
work in one of the five ways set forth in the statute, ‘is an infringer of the copyright.’”); id. 
(discussing and citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006)).  Even if trespass provides an arguable 
analogy, the question remains whether the analogy is best drawn to trespass to real property 
or to chattels, the remedies for which are less absolute. Christina Bohannan, Copyright 
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 983–84 (2007). 
 131. Cf. Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 
61, 95 (2009) (“Why do we differentiate between nuisance and trespass? . . . The concern 
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In contrast, third parties generally experience traditional property rights as a 
direct restriction when they are in proximity to something tangible.132  
Because IP rights reach non-tangible “goods” that may be held 
simultaneously by many actors, the powers exercised by the holder of the 
entitlement extend beyond those in proximity to a parcel of land or chattel. 
Consequently it is often harder to avoid infringing an IP right than a 
traditional property entitlement.  The information costs of learning what is 
permitted are relatively low in the classic trespass setting in which the 
regulated party must simply respect a property line.  Knowing the boundary 
of the permissible is harder when, as in a nuisance case, both property 
owners have property claims and the interference, if any, with property 
rights is non-possessory in nature.133  Matters may be even more 
complicated in the IP context.134 
This point can be illustrated with a silly, but not entirely fanciful, 
example.  Suppose you own both a cat and a laser pointer.  Knowing that 
Fluffy is fascinated by light, you decide to use the pointer to give her some 
exercise.  You are not allowed to enter your neighbor’s property to do so.  
And if you make too much noise or carelessly aim your beam through your 
neighbor’s window he might pursue a nuisance action.  If it happens that he 
also owns U.S. Patent Number 5,443,036, covering this particular method 
of cat exercise, he has the ability to enjoin not only you (even if you pull 
your shades), but also every other person who owns both a laser pointer and 
a cat.135  Trespass law prevents you from going into your neighbor’s house 
for Fluffy’s workout.  Nuisance law stops you from making too much noise.  
Intellectual property law forecloses the activity, period, but with added 
difficulty in determining whether the property right exists in the first 
place.136 
Second and relatedly, other property doctrines may better characterize IP 
rights.  Copyrights and patents also function as negative easements.137  
 
raised by such a drastically enforced right to exclude is that landowners would be vested 
with tremendous veto power over a wide range of uses for any neighboring land.”). 
 132. The rivalrous quality of the tangible world creates a zero sum game in some 
contexts.  Someone has the property; someone does not.  Not so with non-rival goods, which 
can be held by multiple parties at once.  This is not to deny the existence of the utilitarian 
case for treating non-rival goods as rivalrous in order to encourage their production. 
 133. Newman, supra note 131, at 102 (“The ability to accurately identify non-possessory 
use conflicts in advance is subject to much greater uncertainty than is the ability to 
accurately identify the future need for possessory use of resources.”). 
 134. See, e.g., id. at 105–06 (“To avoid infringing a patent, it is not sufficient to avoid 
appropriating or coming into contact with any particular physical objects . . . .  [I]t is only 
through extremely detailed evaluation of uses that anyone is able to determine whether or not 
actions transgress the ‘boundaries’ of the patent.”). 
 135. By the way, U.S. Patent Number 5,443,036 is real. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed 
Nov. 2, 1993). 
 136. For example, evaluating whether the patent is invalid due to obviousness or lack of 
novelty. 
 137. A negative easement is an “easement that prohibits the servient-estate owner from 
doing something, such as building an obstruction.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
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They limit the rights of others to use their own property.  Unlike a 
government regulation, these easements are constantly springing into 
existence with each patent grant or fixation of an original work of 
authorship.  This is not to argue that such grants are illegitimate or 
unjustified, though there is a rich literature that makes both contentions, but 
to note the function of intellectual property law as vesting private actors 
with the power (dressed in the property form) to regulate private property.  
And the method used—the imposition of de facto servitudes in personal 
property—is one that the common law traditionally viewed as suspect.138  
Because limiting doctrines, like fair use in copyright law, offer a check to 
these powers, much of intellectual property law can be seen as the 
mediation between competing property rights.  In this an infringement 
action may also be seen as a form of nuisance, rather than servitude, law.  
Both the infringer and infringee have incompatible, property-backed claims 
that need to be reconciled.139  The information costs of avoiding a property 
rights violation matter here, too, because of uncertainty as to the scope of 
the entitlement, such as the line separating fair use from infringement, or 
the extent to which the holder of the entitlement may be reasonably 
expected to enforce it.140 
 
2009).  I am not the first to characterize IP rights in this manner. Newman, supra note 131, at 
68, 106–07. 
 138. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
945, 954 (1928) (discussing failure of such servitudes to take hold in either England or the 
United States); id. at 981–82 (citing, but disputing, authority that “‘[i]t is also a general rule 
of the common law that a contract restricting the use or controlling subsales cannot be 
annexed to a chattel so as to follow the article and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of 
notice’” (quoting Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907))); Molly Shaffer Van 
Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 906 (2008) (“The conventional wisdom, 
as described by contemporary commentators, is that personal property servitudes are seldom 
enforceable.”). 
 139. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979) (calling on court 
considering a nuisance claim to weigh the “gravity of the harm [against] the utility of the 
actor’s conduct”), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use factors require evaluating the 
“purpose and character” of the copyright use and “effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 140. Cf. Van Houweling, supra note 138, at 914–16 (discussing information costs as 
possible reason for skepticism of servitudes on personal property).  As Professor Newman 
observes: 
Indeed, when translated into their practical effects on the tangible property rights 
of others, IP rights can be seen to constitute a radical departure from the traditional 
principle of numerus clausus.  IP rights amount to a form of a negative easement—
a restriction on the uses owners can make of their tangible property.  They violate, 
however, several traditional limitations on such servitudes.  At common law, only 
a few specific types of activity could be restricted by the use of a negative 
easement:  conduct that blocked the flow of light, air, or water in an artificial 
stream, or conduct that denied support to buildings or structures.  These limitations 
protected a specific tract of adjacent property, making negative easements 
appurtenant by their nature.  For the most part, the refusal of the common law to 
enforce negative easements in gross against subsequent owners of land has 
survived to the present day; while the Third Restatement of Property abandons this 
restriction, the recent innovation of conservation easements generally required 
specific legislation to make them enforceable.  In practice, IP rights are negative 
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Nothing in these observations is incompatible with calling intellectual 
property “property,” but appreciating the countervailing property rights of 
users affects how that property is treated.  In a property dispute, it matters 
whether the defendant is alleged to have committed a trespass, caused a 
nuisance, or violated a servitude.  These classification issues are not swept 
away by claiming that copyright is property.141 
2.  Taking the Bitter with the Sweet 
A second objection is to dismiss such interferences as irrelevant because 
they would not exist but for the creation of the intellectual property in the 
first instance.142  That is, your inability to rip a DVD copy of, say, The 
Matrix is not much of an interference in your property rights if the film did 
not exist prior to its creation, fixation, and protection by copyright.  You 
have “lost” something that you never had.  There are several responses to 
this objection.  First, IP rights may have the effect of precluding 
independent creation.  To be sure, in copyright law, unlike patent law, 
independent creation negates copyright infringement, and the 
idea/expression dichotomy forecloses protection of “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”143  
That does not, however, prevent copyright plaintiffs from attempting to 
extend their rights to encompass what may be characterized as ideas,144 
 
easements in gross that are not limited to real property and that can be used to 
restrict an extremely broad range of uses.  Once acquired, they make servient 
estates of every chattel and every person within the territorial reach of the law.  
These rights are freely transferable, and there are no requirements that the person 
initially acquiring them stand in any sort of privity to the tangible property 
burdened or that the interests protected in any way “touch and concern” that 
property. 
Newman, supra note 131, at 106–07 (footnotes omitted). 
 141. Tom Bell goes further in response to the banality objection by arguing that the 
copyright privilege is inferior by pedigree to the property rights with which it interferes: 
Nonetheless, the definition tendered here does helpfully clarify that copyright 
holders claim special immunities from the obligations that each of us has, in a state 
of nature and at common law, to respect others’ rights to peaceably enjoy their 
persons and properties.  As Hohfeld would say, in other words, “a [copy]privilege 
is the opposite of a duty [to respect others’ natural and common law rights], and 
the correlative of a ‘no-right’ [suffered by defendants in infringement suits].”  That 
offers a more fully and fairly positivist description of copyright, and one more true 
to Hohfeld’s project than descriptions blandly observing that all rights limit each 
other.  To the contrary, our common law and natural rights carry more normative 
weight, and thus more legal weight, than the special rights created by the 
Copyright Act.  A thoroughgoing positivist committed to clarity would therefore 
do best to call copyright not simply property, nor (with all due respect to Hohfeld) 
a liberty relation, but rather a type of privilege. 
Bell, supra note 2, at 530–31 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 142. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 127, at 1566–67 (explaining argument). 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 144. See, e.g., RDF Media Ltd. v. Fox Broad. Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (C.D. Cal. 
2005) (allegation that television program Trading Spouses infringed British show Wife 
Swap); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974–78 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(interpretation of facts surrounding explosion of the Hindenburg). 
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facts,145 procedures,146 or methods of operation147 or from asserting their 
rights when a defendant claims independent creation in good faith, but may 
be responding to the plaintiff’s work on a subconscious level.148 
Indeed, the defendant who engages in subconscious copying has suffered 
an interference with her creative capacities.  This leads to a second response 
to the irrelevance objection:  the creation of works that receive copyright 
protection may leave the public worse off than if they had never been 
created.  Many copyright holders work hard to ensure the ubiquity of their 
works.  Their handiwork may displace non-protected alternatives from 
public consciousness.  Such efforts are unnecessary, however, for a living 
culture.  Culture in general, and works of authorship in particular, would 
exist without copyright.  In a world without IP, people would still make use 
of these works, with some works becoming more prominent than others.  
Just so in our world of copyright protection, except that those who expend 
great effort in placing their works at the cultural forefront also try to control 
their subsequent use.  Participants in cultural life may be in an inferior 
position than they would have been absent copyright if, without copyright, 
an unprotected substitute would have filled the same cultural niche.  Think 
of a painter in a field with a blank canvas.  It is one thing to tell her, “Don’t 
paint my building” if it is a speck in the distance (let’s leave 17 U.S.C. 
§ 120 aside for a moment).149  It is quite another if you have paved the field 
and your construction dominates the horizon.150 
 
 145. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 699–702 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (copying of page numbers in Westlaw’s printed court reporters is not copyright 
infringement). 
 146. See, e.g., Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury, No. C 03-3182 PJH, 2005 WL 
756558, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (concerning yoga sequences claimed to have health 
promoting property). 
 147. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a spreadsheet menu command hierarchy for a computer spreadsheet program 
was an uncopyrightable “method of operation”), aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 
233 (1996). 
 148. See, e.g., Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 
181 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (concluding that copyright infringement may be subconscious); 
Waldron, supra note 127, at 882–83 (“[A]voiding the sort of subconscious influence that the 
judge traced in the Harrisongs case would require the most rigorous and stultifying self-
scrutiny. . . . [A] duty to ensure that one is avoiding subconscious imitation in a world 
resonating with ‘original’ . . . is in fact very burdensome.”). 
 149. The statute precludes efforts to use a copyright in an architectural work “to prevent 
the making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other 
pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is embodied is located 
in or ordinarily visible from a public place.” 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2006). 
 150. Cf. Gordon, supra note 127, at 1568 (“Or consider a landscape photographer.  As 
each bit of the natural landscape is replaced by buildings, statues, and other human artifacts, 
the only way her interest in the common can remain ‘as good’ is if she is given the freedom 
to photograph her new surroundings.”). See generally id. at 1567–70 (discussing how IP may 
leave the public worse off); Waldron, supra note 127, at 885–86 (“[W]e must address one 
another using, not only the resources of a common language and vocabulary, but, in a larger 
sense, whatever images and catch-phrases there are in the world, to provide points of mutual 
understanding and orientation . . . .”).  Professor Waldron also notes the failure of the “no 
hardship” argument to account for the prospect that would-be copiers would not see a world 
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As a matter of policy, copyright’s incentive to produce works offsets this 
displacement effect.  Perhaps this deal is a good one for society at large; 
perhaps not.  But it is a bargain that limits the ability of citizens to use their 
property to participate fully in the culture around them. 
3.  Is Copyright Part of the Common Law Backdrop? 
Nor is it an answer to argue that the long history of intellectual property 
rights makes them a part of the common law fabric such that we need not 
balance competing interests.  The Supreme Court long ago made clear that 
IP entitlements exist outside the common law property framework.151  
Moreover, the fact that federal statutory IP rights have long limited private 
property rights does not mean that property-backed expectations do not 
 
without the copyrighted work as the relevant baseline for comparison.  In such instances, 
they might experience the inability to copy legally as a hardship, one leaving them worse off 
than if the work had never been created.  Id. at 866–67.   
 151. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 
(14 How.) 539 (1852).  One might ask whether the existence of state common law copyright 
regimes, which protected unpublished works and, later, sound recordings, undermine the 
strength of user property expectations. But cf. 1 PATRY, supra note 43, § 1:16 n.2 (“Professor 
[Oren] Bracha also states, ‘There is no known American case that applied or even discussed 
common law copyright’ in the pre-1790 era.” (quoting Oren Bracha, The Ideology of 
Authorship Revisited 44–45 n.116 (Univ. of Tex. Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 82), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=869446)).  The answer is no.  First, common law rights 
were weak, divestible as they were by a work’s publication. LEON H. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 64 (1936) (“Strictly speaking it is not the fact that statutory copyright 
had been acquired which is instrumental in abrogating common law rights, but the fact that 
there had been a general publication.”).  There was therefore traditionally little room for 
action at the state level to shape the property expectations of copyright users.  To be sure, 
this argument is weaker with respect to the pre-1972 treatment of sound recordings, 
depending on whether one views the development of sound recording as a late technology, 
compare infra notes 153–57 and accompanying text, or the possibility of state copyright in 
non-tangible expressions. Thomas J. Griffin, Common-Law Copyright in the Spoken Word, 
32 A.L.R.3d 618, 618 (1970) (discussing limited authority on subject and observing that “the 
courts in a number of cases . . . have indicated that an idea or intellectual production is 
susceptible of common-law copyright only if it is embodied in writing or otherwise reduced 
to tangible form”); see MELVILLE B. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.1 (1976) 
(arguing against common law tangibility requirement).  Second, the protection at state 
common law of unpublished works is consistent with the protection of user property rights.  
Prior to publication, works embodying creative expression are most likely to be within the 
control of their creator.  Protecting an author’s rights to such works will generally go hand in 
hand with protecting the author’s personal property. AMDUR, supra, at 32 (“The rights of an 
author, in his unpublished works, is as much protected at common law as other property in 
his possession.”).  Once the work is published (and divested of state protection), however, 
the competing property claims of the public recipients of the work come into play. See infra 
Part III.B.4.b.  Even before publication, other property interests required balancing in setting 
the scope of common law copyright. Compare, e.g., AMDUR, supra, at 41 (“An absolute, 
unqualified sale of the manuscript or other unpublished work passes the entire property 
therein, including the common law rights of copy.”), with id. at 44–49 (describing status of 
private letters insofar as common law copyright was generally retained by author though title 
over physical copy resides in recipient).  Third, to whatever extent a state common law 
copyright tradition existed, it was excised by the 1976 Act’s removal of publication as a 
requirement for copyright protection (with the limited exception of sound recordings created 
prior to February 15, 1972). See 17 U.S.C. § 301. 
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persist, especially when one remembers that the scope of copyright was 
traditionally narrower.152 
To see why, consider the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.  Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council153 held that a 
regulation that effectively “wipes out” a property’s value constitutes a 
taking requiring just compensation.  The majority allowed that nuisance 
control is an exception to the rule, on the logic that property ownership is 
understood to encompass the duty to refrain from uses that constitute 
nuisances.154  But it limited this exception to regulated conduct that would 
have been recognized as a nuisance early in the common law of property.  
That is, even though the government traditionally regulated activities that 
could be considered nuisances, expanding the reach of such government 
regulations does not alter the common law expectations of property 
owners.155 
Just so with intellectual property law.  Although IP entitlements have 
long coexisted with common law property expectations, the expansion of 
those entitlements in the last century does not rewrite the common law of 
property or alter expectations of the legality of longstanding practices.156  
Changes in IP’s scope may diminish property rights, but the baseline has an 
independent life.  So it is even with respect to property that is created and 
purchased after applicable IP entitlements are on the books.157 
C.  The Role of User Property Rights in Modern Copyright Law 
Scholarship calling attention to copyright’s role as an interference with 
private property generally uses the observation as a springboard for 
critiquing copyright law more generally.158  But the “private property” 
critique plays only a limited role in actual doctrine.  To be sure, the 
 
 152. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 153. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 154. Id. at 1029 (“Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background 
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”). 
 155. Id. at 1031 (explaining that nuisance exception means more than the state’s 
“proffer[ing] the legislature’s declaration that the uses [the landowner] desires are 
inconsistent with the public interest . . . .  [It must instead] identify background principles of 
nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses”). 
 156. Cf. id. at 1031 (“The fact that a particular use has long been engaged in by similarly 
situated owners ordinarily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition . . . .”).  
Proponents of strong personal use rights make the analogous point that certain unlicensed 
uses have long been the norm. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 157. In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held that acquiring property after the date of a 
regulation’s implementation does not bar a regulatory takings claim. Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628–32 (2001). 
 158. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Authors’ Welfare:  Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for 
Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 229 (2003) (“[U]nderstanding copyright as a 
form of authors’ welfare suggests the need for, and potential shape of, reforms to end 
copyright as we know it.”); cf. Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 82–144 (2004) (calling for new defenses to IP liability 
based on limits found in traditional property doctrines). 
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Copyright Act contains some accommodations to user property rights.159  
Most prominently, the first-sale doctrine protects user interests in 
copyrighted material to the extent that a lawful copy—i.e., a piece of 
personal property—embodies that material.160  One could even describe the 
doctrine’s pre-codification emergence as an example of judicial protection 
of common law property expectations.161  In this light, the doctrine looks 
less like an exception carved from copyright law and more a vindication of 
a discrete set of legal interests. 
In a similar vein, the Copyright Act limits exclusive rights to perform or 
display a copyrighted work by exempting non-public performances and 
displays.162  This limitation respects user property rights in two ways.  First, 
it insulates a wide range of basic personal uses of tangible copies and 
phonorecords from legal scrutiny.  Second, it protects a user’s right to play 
with copyrighted material in the comfort of her own home qua home (i.e., 
not as a staging ground of a commercial enterprise).  Section 110’s 
carveouts to a copyright holder’s right to control performance and display 
of her work respect private property by exempting communication of 
transmissions received by “a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly 
used in private homes” and by permitting members of households to obtain 
edited audio and video content.163  The Audio Home Recording Act’s 
exemption of non-commercial analog and certain digital copying of music 
is to the same effect.164 
Generally speaking, however, user-based private property considerations 
play a limited role in copyright doctrine.  And what attention there is 
focuses largely on property in the copies and phonorecords that embody 
protected material.165  Copyright law’s creation of easements in private 
property is largely ignored.  So much the worse for personal use rights.  
Copyright’s claim to be a socially beneficial incentive to create is strongest 
when considering the copies of works that copyright protection supposedly 
brought forth.  The surface case for allowing copyright to interfere with 
property rights might appear weaker if the property in question were not so 
closely tied to copyright’s purported bounty. 
 
 159. The statute’s division of interests between a copyright and a copy may protect user 
property rights. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (providing that transfer of copyright 
ownership does not “convey property rights in any material object”). 
 160. Id. § 109. 
 161. And I do. See infra Part III.D.1.a; see also Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies:  
Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1302 
(2001) (“Put another way, physical copy owner ‘rights’ are defined primarily by the law of 
personal property, with copyright law imposing a few limited restrictions.  The idea of 
physical copy ownership thus seems to provide a simple and intuitively appealing 
explanation for the incidents of physical copy ownership.”). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4)–(6). 
 163. Id. § 110(5), (10). 
 164. Id. § 1008. 
 165. Cf. Patterson, supra note 124, at 712–14 (explicating distinction between work and 
copyright and how overlooking it broadens the rights of copyright holders). 
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The absence of private property considerations from copyright parallels 
the relative inattention paid to copyright uses that are neither simple 
consumption nor authorial transformation.166  Similar inattention applies to 
the user’s personally owned tools that enable copying.  Even if courts do 
not target individual users of such equipment, a narrow judicial 
understanding of legal copyright use may ultimately endanger consumer 
access to such products.167 
D.  Why User Property Rights Matter 
Paying more attention to private property rights could aid the future 
development of personal copyright use rights.  First, common law property 
rights provide a legal basis for claiming the existence of user rights 
independent of the Copyright Act.  Absent a regulation to the contrary, and 
subject to the property rights of others, personal property ownership carries 
with it the familiar bundle of rights commonly associated with property.  
One is free to use, exclude, transfer, gift, sell, or otherwise dispose of her 
property as she wishes.168  This is no less true of property subject to 
copyright’s negative easements.  Stated another way, if the Copyright Act 
neglects to give copyright owners the power to forbid a particular copyright 
use, users have that right as part of their basic common law rights, not as a 
matter of federal neglect or statutory vacuum.169 
 
 166. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 86, at 401 (“[C]opyright law contains at least two primary 
conceptions of the consumer:  the consumer as passive consumer and the consumer as 
author.”); supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra Part I.A.2.; cf. Liu, supra note 86, at 428 (arguing that “courts, in dealing 
with new technologies, should acknowledge and give some weight to consumer interests in 
autonomy, communication, and self-expression,” particularly when considering if “new 
kinds of uses (such as those enabled by new technology like MP3 players, TiVo, ad-stripping 
software, and web browsers) constitute fair use”). 
 168. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l. Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“The purchaser of a patented article has the rights of any owner of personal property, 
including the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to 
overriding conditions of the sale.”); City of Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638, 644 
(1878) (“Undoubtedly, the right to use property as the owner may please, provided that 
reasonable care is taken not to do unnecessary injury to others, is the ordinary rule.”); 
Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enters., 460 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1969) (“[E]very person has a 
right to use his own property as he sees fit so long as that use does not invade the rights of 
his neighbor unreasonably and substantially.”); Mayer v. Grueber, 138 N.W.2d 197, 204 
(Wis. 1965) (“It is elementary that the owner of private property may make any proper use 
of it so long as he does not interfere with the rights of the public.”); 63C AM. JUR. 2D 
Property § 1 (2009) (“‘[P]roperty’ [in a thing] does not consist merely in its ownership or 
possession, but also in the lawful, unrestricted right of its use, enjoyment, and disposal.”).  
 169. Cf. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 n.7 (2008) 
(citing Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (“Whether a patentee 
may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is 
not a question before us, and upon which we express no opinion.  It is, however, obvious that 
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent 
meaning and effect of the patent laws.”)) (noting that patentees may bargain for use 
restrictions on sold products, but such rights cannot arise under patent law). 
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Second, and relatedly, user property rights provide the baseline against 
which federal copyright law acts.  Copyright is a creature of statute.170  But 
the Copyright Act cannot answer every question concerning the copyright’s 
functioning.  Courts must play a role, determining whether settled 
expectations remain intact and filling statutory gaps when necessary.  As 
discussed in greater detail below, when they do, they should do so 
cognizant of the common law backdrop against which they interpret the 
statute.  For user rights, the applicable common law baseline should be 
clear:  owners of personal property may use their property in a lawful 
manner.  Absent the interposition of copyright or another limiting doctrine, 
the presumption is that individuals have the right to use their property as 
they see fit.  Longstanding common law property rights are properly part of 
any court’s interpretation of what the Copyright Act removes from property 
law and what remains. 
Last, while this Article leaves aside the question whether copyright 
should be described as property, rhetoric matters.  The more copyright, or 
any exclusive IP entitlement, is characterized as “property” rather than, say, 
“monopoly,” so much the better for the holder of the entitlement.  Judges 
are prone to engage in moralizing once talk turns to a trespass on a 
plaintiff’s property.171  Apprehension of copyright’s dual status as an 
interference with property rights offers at least a partial corrective to this 
temptation. 
E.  Background Principles and Statutory Interpretation 
Background principles of property law may find their way into copyright 
doctrine in at least two ways.  First, judges could take seriously the 
principle that courts do not lightly depart from common law baselines.  
Appreciating the baseline rights that copyright users held as property 
owners prior to the adoption of the 1976 Act should guide interpretation of 
the extent to which the statute supersedes them.  Second, judges may draw 
from common law principles in filling interstitial gaps in the Copyright Act 
with respect to the powers of copyright owners. 
1.  Departing From the Baseline 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid172 is the textbook example 
of the importance of common law principles to statutory interpretation in 
 
 170. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 171. As commentators have often noticed: 
As one court explained, “The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on 
legally recognized rights in intellectual property.” The court did not, however, 
examine “the legally recognized rights” and as its smug assertion suggests, a major 
harm of copyright as a proprietary monopoly is that it obscures the sacrifice of free 
speech rights on the copyright altar. 
Patterson, supra note 124, at 719 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
 172. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
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copyright law.173  In Reid, the Supreme Court looked to the common law to 
interpret the meaning of the word “employee” in the statute’s work-for-hire 
provision.174 
But common law precedents provide more than a statutory glossary.  
They form the baseline against which legislatures modify traditional 
understandings of rights and entitlements.  Given the ubiquity of such 
understandings, and the difficulties inherent in drafting legislation that 
contemplates every contingency, courts are reluctant to assume that statutes 
casually discard well-established legal principles absent a clear legislative 
directive. 175 
 
 173. For textbook usage, see, for example, ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & 
MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 447 (rev. 4th 
ed. 2007). 
 174. Reid, 490 U.S. at 741 (“[T]he term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the 
general common law of agency.”).  Reid could be characterized as an example of federal 
common lawmaking. See, e.g., Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights Are Not Community 
Property, 60 LA. L. REV. 127, 148 (1999) (describing Reid as creating federal common law); 
William Patry, Choice of Law and International Copyright, 48 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 383, 415 
(2000) (“This is a common law of a very limited kind, and it may, in fact, be more accurate 
to describe the Court’s approach as an interpretation of a statute rather than the creation of a 
body of law.”).  Federal common law is discussed in greater detail below, so some precision 
is required with respect to language.  I would draw a distinction between situations in which 
courts look to the common law to help define a term as a matter of statutory construction and 
the “judicial filling of statutory interstices.” Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the 
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964); see also Jay Dratler, Jr., 
Common-Sense (Federal) Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster Was a 
Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413, 420 (2006) 
(“When a statute speaks on a subject and comes close to giving an answer, but requires 
extrapolation to new or unanticipated circumstances, statutory interpretation is appropriate.  
In contrast, when the statute is silent and the legislative history suggests a huge open 
issue . . . federal-common-law analysis is appropriate.”).  The line between the two situations 
is often hard to draw, as an undefined term is arguably a gap. See, e.g., Grynberg, supra note 
42, at 948–53. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (“‘Statutes which invade 
the common law . . . are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of long-
established and familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is 
evident.’  In such cases, Congress does not write upon a clean slate.  In order to abrogate a 
common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the 
common law.” (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952); Mobil Oil 
Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (citing Astoria Federal Savings & Loan 
Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 
(1981))); Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (“[W]here a common-law principle is well established . . . 
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the 
principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.’” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Isbrandtsen, 343 U.S. at 783)); Miedema v. Maytag Corp., 450 F.3d 1322, 
1329 (11th Cir. 2006) (“While the text of [the Class Action Fairness Act] plainly expands 
federal jurisdiction over class actions and facilitates their removal, ‘[w]e presume that 
Congress legislates against the backdrop of established principles of state and federal 
common law, and that when it wishes to deviate from deeply rooted principles, it will say 
so.’” (quoting United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 900 (11th Cir. 2003)) (citing 
White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1434–35 (11th Cir. 
1997))); Duvall v. Attorney Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Congress is expected 
to legislate against the backdrop of well-established common law principles.  An accepted 
common law doctrine should be implied in a statutory scheme, despite the absence of 
express authorization, if application of the doctrine is consistent with the structure and 
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This principle does work in multiple intellectual property doctrines.  In 
patent law, the patent exhaustion doctrine survives despite Congress’s 
failure to codify it.176  Similarly, the Supreme Court relied on traditional 
understandings of equitable remedies to reject the Federal Circuit’s law of 
patent injunctions.  Instead of a presumption in favor of equitable relief, the 
Court demanded a more context-oriented approach in accord with its 
conception of traditional injunction law and the principle that “a major 
departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly 
implied.”177 
Unfair competition law, to take another example, has long recognized the 
principle that functional matter cannot receive trademark protection.  If a 
roadside sign uses a spring mechanism to prevent the wind from blowing it 
down, for example, the springs may not be trademarked.178  This principle 
ran into difficulty because Congress codified a set of defenses to trademark 
claims brought by holders of registered incontestable trademarks.179  That 
list omitted functionality, creating the danger that an expressio unius 
argument could defeat what trademark law had always recognized as a basis 
for attacking a trademark’s validity.  The Eleventh Circuit resisted that logic 
and held that incontestable marks may be canceled on functionality 
grounds.  The court reasoned that the centrality of functionality to 
traditional trademark doctrine engendered doubt that Congress would 
lightly (and silently) eliminate it.  Instead, the statute (as it stood at the time 
in question) made no mention of functionality, making the court “hesitant to 
read the Act as limiting the doctrine’s reach” without a stronger textual 
signal.180 
 
purpose of that scheme.” (citing Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108–11)); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance 
v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 764 (10th Cir. 2005) (“It is reasonable to assume 
that when Congress granted rights of way for the construction of highways across the 
unreserved lands of the West in 1866, it was aware of and incorporated the common law 
pertaining to the nature of public highways and how they are established.”).  “Clear” in this 
context does not mean explicit. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (“This interpretative presumption is 
not, however, one that entails a requirement of clear statement, to the effect that Congress 
must state precisely any intention to overcome the presumption’s application to a given 
statutory scheme.”). 
 176. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115–17 
(2008) (outlining history of patent exhaustion). 
 177. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (quoting Weinberger v. 
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982)). 
 178. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001). 
 179. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2006).  On incontestable marks generally, see id. §§ 1065, 
1115 (providing that if a registration has become incontestable, “the registration shall be 
conclusive evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of the registration of the mark, 
of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the 
registered mark in commerce”). 
 180. Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 1999).  
The court explained: 
Consequently, the mere fact that functionality is not enumerated in § 1115(b) is not 
sufficient to indicate congressional intent to eliminate the defense’s applicability to 
incontestable registrations.  Indeed, given the absence of any explicit reference to 
the functionality doctrine, which is a judicially created concept that predates the 
Lanham Act, we should be hesitant to read the Act as limiting the doctrine’s reach.  
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2.  Filling Interstices 
The common law baseline also supplies substance to statutes.  The 
modern federal “common law” tradition accepts that courts fill statutory 
gaps where necessary to implement congressional legislation, particularly in 
realms where the federal scheme is pervasive.181  While such gaps are often 
filled by borrowing the rule of the state in which the interpreting court sits, 
courts also look to principles of general law to fill them, principles that 
naturally reside in common law traditions.182 
3.  Common Law Baselines and Copyright:  Secondary Liability 
The principles discussed above have already left their mark on copyright.  
The Supreme Court has used common law baselines to expand copyright’s 
scope beyond the clear terms of its authorizing legislation, reflecting the 
importance of the common law both as a basis for limiting the import of the 
Copyright Act’s text and as a source of rules to fill the resulting gaps in the 
statute. 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.183 is primarily 
remembered for two propositions:  (1) Providers of tools used for copyright 
infringement are not liable for contributory infringement based only on 
their provision of tools capable of substantial non-infringing uses;184 and 
(2) using a VCR to “time shift” broadcast programming is a non-infringing 
 
“The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for 
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that 
intent specific.” 
Id. (quoting Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 
(1986)).  To be sure, the Fourth Circuit disagreed. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 
9 F.3d 1091, 1099 (4th Cir. 1993).  Congress ultimately clarified the matter by amending the 
statute to include a functionality defense and to incorporate the functionality principle into 
the federal trademark statute generally.  Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. 
No. 105-330, § 201, 112 Stat. 3064, 3069–70 (1998) (providing for “technical corrections” 
to the trademark statute). Wilhelm Pudenz was an interpretation of pre-1998 law. 
 181. See, e.g., CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4514 
(1996) (describing “situations in which neither Congress nor the Constitution has provided a 
rule of decision for the resolution of a federal question case that is properly within the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts;” in such matters “it can be inferred from 
congressional or constitutional intent that the federal courts should supply the necessary rule 
of decision by pronouncing common law to fill the interstices of a pervasively federal 
substantive framework”); Friendly, supra note 174, at 421. 
 182. As Caleb Nelson has written, when federal courts engage in common lawmaking and 
do not feel constrained to adopt the rule of the local state, they are unlikely to engage in 
flights of judicial creativity.  Rather, they will craft doctrine with an eye to “general law—
rules whose content is not dictated entirely by any single decisionmaker (state or federal), 
but instead emerges from patterns followed in many different jurisdictions.”  Caleb Nelson, 
The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 503 (2006). 
 183. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 184. Id. at 442 (“Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other 
articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely 
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.  Indeed, it need merely be capable of 
substantial noninfringing uses.”). 
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fair use.185  These decisions would have been unnecessary had the Court 
not first determined that the Copyright Act provides a cause of action for 
indirect infringement. 
To do so the Court had to overcome the statute’s silence on third party 
liability, and the Court’s own acknowledgement that the “remedies for 
infringement are only those prescribed by Congress.”186  The Court 
nonetheless formulated a contributory copyright infringement doctrine.187  
While nominally grounded in analogy to the Patent Act,188 the third party 
liability rule relied on a line of precedents that based liability on the 
defendant’s ability to control the direct infringer’s conduct.  The Court 
traced these results to basic common law principles of vicarious liability.189 
 
 185. Id. at 454–55 (“[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the District 
Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”). 
 186. Id. at 431 (“Thus, long before the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1909, it was 
settled that the protection given to copyrights is wholly statutory.  The remedies for 
infringement are only those prescribed by Congress.” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 187. To be sure, the legislative history contains language suggesting that the Copyright 
Act’s reference to the owner’s exclusive right “to authorize” statutorily prohibited uses 
opened the door to third party liability. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 (stating that “[u]se of the phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to 
avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers” and using as an example a 
lawful purchaser of an authorized motion picture copy who “engages in the business of 
renting it to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance”).  Sony at least nods in 
this direction, though the core of its reasoning on third party liability is elsewhere. Sony, 464 
U.S. at 435.  And indeed, it is difficult to stretch the meaning of “authorization” to capture 
third party liability outside the vicarious liability context. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th 
ed. 2004) (defining “authorize” as, “To give legal authority; to empower <he authorized the 
employee to act for him>. 2. To formally approve; to sanction <the city authorized the 
construction project>.”).  In Sony no such supervisory relationship existed with respect to the 
VCR maker and its customers, as the Court acknowledged. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437–38 (noting 
that in earlier cases “the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of 
copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the 
copyright owner” but that the present case “plainly does not fall in that category.  The only 
contact between Sony and the users of the Betamax that is disclosed by this record occurred 
at the moment of sale.”).  Small wonder then that the Court’s later return to secondary 
liability principles in Grokster made no mention of this argument. But see Note, Central 
Bank and Intellectual Property, 123 HARV. L. REV. 730, 745 (2010) (arguing that “the 
‘authorize’ clause justifies Grokster and liability for intentional contributions, but not 
necessarily liability for knowing contributions”). 
 188. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (in both patent and copyright law “the contributory 
infringement doctrine is grounded on the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly 
may require the courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the 
products or activities that make such duplication possible”). 
 189. Id. at 437 (“In such cases, as in other situations in which the imposition of vicarious 
liability is manifestly just, the ‘contributory’ infringer was in a position to control the use of 
copyrighted works by others and had authorized the use without permission from the 
copyright owner.”).  This conclusion was not inevitable. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994) (rejecting aiding and 
abetting suit under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and stating “when Congress 
enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant 
for the defendant’s violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the 
plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors”); cf. id. at 193 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When 
§ 10(b) was enacted, aiding and abetting liability was widely, albeit not universally, 
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The resort to common law principles is clearer still in Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,190 which held that inducing copyright 
infringement creates liability under the statute.191  While the Court looked 
again to the Patent Act for its standard,192 Grokster based its holding in 
precedents grounded in common law third party liability rules:  “at common 
law a copyright or patent defendant who ‘not only expected but invoked 
[infringing use] by advertisement’ was liable for infringement ‘on 
principles recognized in every part of the law.’”193  In other words, 
traditional common law principles provide the standards for when a 
defendant may be liable for the acts of a third party.  Although Congress 
failed to codify these principles, the Court refused to conclude that silence 
equaled abrogation.  “Although ‘[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly 
render anyone liable for infringement committed by another,’ these 
doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and 
are well established in the law.”194 
Sony and Grokster also look to the common law to fill perceived gaps in 
the Copyright Act.  Having determined that the statute does not displace 
common law third party liability principles, the Court implemented those 
very principles to provide content to the contributory infringement cause of 
action.195  Because Congress did not legislate exhaustively (or, indeed, at 
all) about secondary copyright liability,196 the Court looked to common law 
principles (as embodied in the patent statute) for guidance in fleshing out 
the statute.197 
 
recognized in the law of torts and in state legislation prohibiting misrepresentation in the 
marketing of securities.  The courts’ reliance on common-law tort principles in defining the 
scope of liability under § 10(b) was by no means an anomaly.” (citations omitted)). 
 190. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 191. Id. at 919 (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting 
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to 
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). 
 192. Id. at 936 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent 
law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one 
for copyright.”). 
 193. Id. at 935 (quoting Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911)); see also 
id. at 934-35 (“[N]othing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such 
evidence, and the case was never meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived 
from the common law.”). 
 194. Id. at 930 (citations omitted) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 434). 
 195. Dratler, supra note 174, at 421 & n.37. 
 196. Of course one could argue that the absence of third party liability provisions in the 
statute is not an open question in need of a judicially supplied answer, but rather a 
congressional directive that third party liability principles do not apply to federal copyright 
law. Cf., e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 
97 (1981) (“But the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the 
authority to fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not 
to adopt. . . .  The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is 
strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an 
integrated system of procedures for enforcement.” (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 
436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). 
 197. See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text; Dratler, supra note 174, at 421 
(“Whether invited by Congress or not, the Supreme Court felt it had a duty to recognize and 
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III.  INTEGRATING USER PROPERTY RIGHTS INTO COPYRIGHT LAW 
Just as invocations of common law principles have expanded copyright, 
so too may they constrain it.  The property rights of copyright users could 
vindicate personal use rights in two ways.  First, they are the source of a 
limiting construction to the rights given copyright owners by statute.  
Second, reasonable expectations of a right to use one’s own property 
provide the basis of an expanded implied license doctrine. 
A.  User Property Rights as Limiting Construction 
Taking common law personal property rights seriously means courts 
should be circumspect in reading the Copyright Act to reach conduct lying 
outside copyright’s traditional scope.  As discussed above, when legislation 
detracts from common law rights, the carveouts need to be clear.198  This 
principle provides a legal basis for respecting copyright’s historical 
boundaries.  Historians of the Copyright Act contend that judges have long 
recognized that the statute’s incursions into personal liberty must recognize 
and respect the existence of individual user rights.  They argue that future 
interpretations of copyright should be consistent with those understandings, 
especially since nothing in the 1976 revisions explicitly targeted personal 
use rights.199  Appreciating the common law baseline provides a doctrinal 
basis for this directive when the use in question implicates the user’s 
property rights. 
This sort of “copyright lenity” is consistent with the nature of copyright.  
As discussed above, copyright may be seen as a negative easement on 
personal property.200  Servitudes of this sort are traditionally disfavored, 
suggesting the need for judicial caution regarding expansive interpretations 
of the Copyright Act.201  Indeed, judicial skepticism of personal property 
servitudes already has left its mark upon intellectual property doctrine.  In 
both the patent and copyright realms, judges—not legislators—were 
 
apply the universal principle of law that there are circumstances under which A may be 
liable for B’s tort.”). 
 198. See supra note 175. 
 199. Litman, Lawful Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1883–94 (describing older 
precedents); id. at 1913 (describing expansion of perceived commercial scope of copyright 
monopoly); Patterson, supra note 124, at 706 (“[D]uring the nineteenth, and much of the 
twentieth century, copyright was a regulatory monopoly limited to the marketing of works 
and could be defined as consisting of limited rights to which a given work was subject for a 
limited period of time.”). 
 200. See supra Part II.A. 
 201. See, e.g., Chafee, supra note 138, at 954 (discussing failure of such servitudes to 
take hold in either England or the United States); id. at 981–82 (citing, but disputing, 
authority that “‘[i]t is also a general rule of the common law that a contract restricting the 
use or controlling subsales cannot be annexed to a chattel so as to follow the article and 
obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice’” (quoting Park v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 
(6th Cir. 1907))). 
2010] PROPERTY IS A TWO-WAY STREET 475 
initially responsible for crafting the exhaustion and first-sale doctrines that 
protected user rights in property that embodied protected IP.202   
Attempts to read the post-1976 Copyright Act as forbidding use of 
personal property to engage in activities implicating copyrighted matter 
must therefore contend not only with traditional property rights but also 
traditional views of how copyright law mediates between the private 
property interests of copyright users and the entitlements granted to 
copyright owners by federal statute.  If a copyright holder argues that 
today’s Copyright Act abrogates a property right traditionally enjoyed by 
users, it should not be enough that the statute hints that copyright sweeps so 
broadly.  The intent must “‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the 
common law.”203 
This limiting construction of the statute could ameliorate the difficulties 
created by copyright’s overlapping rights and the statute’s mismatching 
language with respect to copyright and its limitations.204  If the structure of 
the Act places a thumb on the scale in favor of expansive copyright, 
common law expectations may provide a counterweight. 
One could argue in response that Congress has spoken with the requisite 
clarity in section 106’s grant to the copyright holder of “exclusive rights to 
do and to authorize” any of the acts protected by the statute.205  Assuming 
this argument negates any user claim of a common law “override” to the 
contrary, does this mean that the common law baseline is irrelevant?  No.  
The contention here is not that the Copyright Act does not interfere with the 
property rights of users.  Rather, the argument is that in situations in which 
the scope of that interference is unclear, courts should take into account the 
backdrop against which the Copyright Act is operating.  There is little 
doubt, for example, that the statute gives the copyright holder the exclusive 
right to publicly perform a copyrighted work.  That does not answer the 
question whether consumer-directed retrievals of television programming 
from an off-site facility constitute a public performance.206  It is proper to 
look to background expectations where an unclear statute is applied to an 
unanticipated context that was technically unlikely at the time of enactment.  
And if Congress meant to radically rewrite the relationship between 
copyright holders and those engaged in non-commercial uses of 
 
 202. Chafee, supra note 138, at 955 (“In the United States, although supported by a few 
state decisions, [price maintenance licensing requirements] ha[ve] been decisively repudiated 
by the Supreme Court even when applied to the subject matter of statutory monopolies.”); 
see also infra Part III.D.1.a. 
 203. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)) (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 
(1981)). 
 204. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 205. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 206. See generally Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009); see supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
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copyrighted works, it is reasonable to expect Congress to include a 
provision that explicitly says so.207 
Moreover, even though section 106 vests certain rights in copyright 
holders at the expense of third-party property rights, that does not mean that 
those rights have no role to play in the statute’s implementation.  The 
common law also provides fodder for filling statutory gaps.  What it means 
for a use to be unauthorized presents such a gap.  This opening provides the 
basis for the expanded use of implied licenses in copyright law. 
B.  Implied Authorization:  A New Implied License Doctrine 
There is no doubt that the Copyright Act intrudes on the common law 
property rights of copyright users.  Section 106 grants to copyright holders 
the exclusive right to reproduce, perform, display, distribute, or make 
derivative works from their copyrights and the right to “authorize” such 
actions.208  The statute does not, however, explicate fully how authorization 
(or its revocation) operates in practice. 
Implied license law to date represents an incomplete look to the common 
law to fill the gap.  Courts incorporated common law principles found in 
ordinary contract transactions and licenses concerning rivalrous property to 
fill out the meaning and practice of authorization under section 106.209  But 
because judges generally have not grappled with copyright’s status as 
property regulation, their view of the relevant common law is unduly 
narrow. 
A complete view would appreciate that authorization operates in a legal 
context in which the putative licensee already has the right under the 
common law of property to engage in the licensed activity but for the 
copyright holder’s (often indeterminate) negative easement in the licensee’s 
personal property.  As a result, the licensee’s baseline expectations are quite 
different than those found in the ordinary licensing context.  Traditional 
expectations developed under the assumption that the licensee cannot act 
but for the permission of the licensor. 
Defining and accommodating expectations in the copyright context opens 
the door to a richer view of implied licenses than previously contemplated.  
In considering the matter, courts must take into account the background 
rights and expectations of both sides of the transaction. 
This Article proposes that courts may consider challenged instances of 
personal copyright use as follows:  assuming the user has engaged in 
conduct falling under the scope of section 106, the court should consider 
whether she had an objectively reasonable expectation that her use of her 
own property was legal.  This analysis would take into account prevailing 
 
 207. See supra Part II.E.1.  To the contrary, the statute implicitly endorses non-
commercial uses. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (calling for consideration of market effect in fair use 
analysis). 
 208. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 209. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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norms with respect to the activity in question as well as any ambiguity 
about whether section 106 reaches the conduct.  If the defendant user had an 
expectation of a right to engage in the activity, the analysis would then shift 
to consider whether the copyright holder had taken sufficient steps to assert 
his copyright—to “opt-out” as it were from the user’s plans for the 
copyright owner’s property210—in a manner that the defendant was 
obligated to honor.  The remainder of this subpart fits this view of implied 
license into the analysis developed above. 
1.  Taking Intellectual Property’s Uniqueness Seriously 
To say that copyright functions as a negative easement on the private 
property of copyright users is not to critique copyright’s existence, but 
simply to note its character.  It is a regulation not only of individual liberty, 
but also property.211 
If so, then the copyright user’s expectations cannot simply be defined by 
the copyright holder’s conduct.  Even if we assume arguendo that 
copyrights are property, they are not the only property at issue.  The 
background understanding that one has a right to use one’s own property 
(i.e., the tools used to engage in infringement) remains.  That is the source 
of the copyright user’s authorization or license to engage in what might 
otherwise be perceived as an infringing act.212  Rather than require an 
authorizing act of the copyright holder, some uses are, in effect, “pre-
 
 210. See infra Part III.D.2.c; see also Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
617 (2008).  Professor Wu cites several examples of situations in which a copyright holder 
should have to take action before liability could be possible and argues for greater use of 
such mechanisms. Id. at 621–22.  His focus is more on why such mechanisms are a good 
idea and less on how they may be grounded in existing law. 
 211. See supra Part II.A; see also Gordon, supra note 127, at 1559–60 (“It is conceptually 
untenable to treat ‘property’ and ‘liberty’ as if they were fully separate categories.  Every 
conventional private property right contains a ‘liberty to use,’ and some liberties are public 
property strong enough to keep conventional private property from forming.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
  Keeping in mind the continuity between property and liberty concepts, this Article 
focuses on property rights, rather than liberty interests, as a basis for promoting user rights 
for two reasons.  First, the common law offers a richer tradition of protection of property 
rights as a specific body of law than it does a general common law of liberty (for example, 
there is no first-year course in “liberty” even though liberty interests are implicated by 
courses in property, contracts, etc.).  Second, discussion of liberty interests naturally leads to 
talk of constitutional protections, specifically freedom of speech.  But First Amendment 
defenses generally fare poorly in copyright litigation. See supra note 78. But see Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Liberating Copyright:  Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 
465 (2010) (proposing approach “grounded in our understanding of the ‘liberty’ protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments” as a “foundation for certain types of uses by 
individuals that are integral to those individuals’ identities”). 
 212. This perspective addresses Professor Litman’s critique of other efforts to rely on 
implied license because they focus too much on the perspective of copyright owners rather 
than users. Litman, Creative Reading, supra note 89, at 179 (“[B]y ignoring the central 
importance of readers, listeners, viewers, and players in the copyright scheme, we have all 
but conceded that the essential policy question in determining whether a use of copyrighted 
material should be lawful is the way the use looks from the viewpoint of the copyright 
owner.”). 
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authorized,” especially if the state of the law is such that the user lacks 
notice that her property is encumbered by the copyright holder’s 
privilege.213 
This does not mean that the text of section 106 does not mean what it 
says.  It remains within the copyright holder’s power to forbid certain 
conduct, and she retains the power to revoke licenses that are implied under 
the framework discussed here.214  What it does mean, however, is that full 
assertion of the copyright holder’s rights may demand that she take steps to 
assert that entitlement in an appropriate manner.215 
Nor does this mean that anything goes for the user.  Having property 
does not bring with it the assumption that one can do anything with it.  One 
must determine the scope of the authorization that stems from owning 
property that may interact with copyrighted matter.  It is here that norms 
respecting permissible uses of copyrighted matter may be integrated into 
doctrine.  On one end of the spectrum, computer owners may forward e-
mail without fear of an infringement claim.  At the other end, the owner of a 
video camera should know not to videotape the latest Transformers movie 
from inside the theater.216  The difference between the two situations is 
reflected by existing norms.  Room for doctrinal development—for 
“infusing reasonableness” into copyright law217—lies between these 
extremes. 
Other norms may similarly frame a court’s inquiry.  For example, norms 
treating amateur fan fiction as a reasonable activity also scorn attempts to 
commercialize such works—partly due to fear of attracting greater 
resistance from holders of the copyright entitlement.218  This suggests that 
attempts by the user to commercialize her activities will generally exceed 
the scope of her authorization.219  Expanding our conception of implied 
licenses to include user expectations of personal property rights allows such 
norms room to operate within copyright law.220  Stated another way, the 
 
 213. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  SERVITUDES § 7.14 (2000) (“The benefit of 
an unrecorded servitude, including a servitude created by prescription, implication, estoppel, 
or oral grant, is subject to extinguishment under an applicable recording act . . . .”); id. 
(providing an exception for “a servitude that would be discovered by reasonable inspection 
or inquiry”). 
 214. Though, of course, in traditional property contexts a license may become 
irrevocable. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 2, at 510. 
 215. As is true in the real property context as well. See infra note 253. 
 216. As a matter of aesthetics if nothing else. See also infra note 301. 
 217. Afori, supra note 102, at 290. 
 218. Steven A. Hetcher, Using Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1869, 1884–87 (2009); cf. id. at 1887 (discussing putative norm among 
copyright holders that copyright holders will tolerate non-commercial remixes of their works 
but noting that “there is an ongoing battle between this more tolerant norm and one that does 
not tolerate such uses”). 
 219. See also infra Part III.D.2.a. 
 220. It is not uncommon for judges to allow such norms to guide development of the law, 
particularly if there is reason to believe that such customs are welfare maximizing. See, e.g., 
Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881). See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW 254 (1991).  Ellickson’s account of norms, and the literature it inspired, is perhaps 
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permission to use the copyrighted material comes from the user’s 
ownership of the tool she uses for the interaction.  Whether that perception 
is objectively reasonable depends in part on the operative social norm and 
on the court’s willingness to honor that expectation as reasonable.221 
2.  Harmonizing Copyright and Common Law 
This view of implied license is consistent with the Copyright Act.  So 
long as copyright holders retain their exclusive right to “authorize” uses of 
copyrighted material covered by section 106, the statutory minimum is met.  
But nothing in the statute evinces the intent to override the common law 
presumptions that attend ownership of personal property.  Traditional tools 
of statutory construction favor construing the statute in a manner that 
respects these preexisting expectations.222 
The Copyright Act does not define the term “authorize” or explain how 
authorization is supposed to operate.  This gap gives courts room to create 
space for preexisting common law private property rights.  Those rights, in 
turn, supply a backdrop for elaborating how authorization works in 
practice.223  And the Act leaves many open questions on this front.  What 
constitutes authorization?  How is it perceived?  When is it revoked, and 
when should a licensee be deemed as having notice of the revocation?224 
 
removed from the discussion here insofar as copyright owners and users are often not in a 
close-knit relationship, though it is worth noting that one of Ellickson’s examples of norm 
evolution involves copyright. ELLICKSON, supra, at 258–64.  The argument here, in any case, 
is directed not to how norms involving copyright evolve, but whether there is a legal basis 
for permitting their operation. 
  Relatedly, Jennifer Rothman has argued that intellectual property norms, or customs 
in her account, should be discounted as a basis for doctrinal guidance in part because rights 
holders have a disproportionate influence on the shape of custom. Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1957 (2007) 
(“The most powerful IP owners have the greatest influence on both the creation and 
establishment of IP customs.  The end result of this inequitable evolution is that smaller 
players in the IP markets and the public at large are inadequately represented by the 
emerging customs.”).  In my view, the danger comes not from looking to custom, but from 
an overly narrow view of whose customs—and whose property-backed expectations—
matter. Cf. id. at 1964 (“Neither the expectations of IP owners or risk-averse IP users should 
govern the scope of IP rights.”). 
 221. There is nothing unusual about leaving a role for courts to interject conclusions as to 
whether norm-based expectations are objectively reasonable. Cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (rejecting Fourth Amendment claim despite subjective expectation of 
privacy where “respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such 
observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor”); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding 
of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first 
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that 
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). 
 222. See supra Part II.E.1. 
 223. Or, alternatively, for the interpretation and construction of the statutory term 
“authoriz[ation].” See supra note 174. 
 224. One might ask what more Congress could have done to vest—if that was its 
intention—absolute authorization rights in the hands of copyright holders.  Leaving aside 
that no such intention appears in the 1976 Act’s legislative history, see supra note 92 and 
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Common law property rights respond to these questions by helping to 
define the licensee’s expectations.  These expectations are more important 
in the copyright context than in other implied license settings.  A 
straightforward application of traditional understandings of implied licenses 
is therefore unsound.  In traditional settings, like contract or real property, 
the licensee has no reasonable expectation of a license until the putative 
licensor acts—for example, there is no contract without a promise; going 
onto someone else’s land without permission is trespass. 
Copyright is different.  Copyright’s non-rivalrousness means that we 
cannot simply take as our paradigmatic licensee the rational actor at the 
other end of a negotiated, arm’s length transaction.  In the copyright 
context, the “licensee” is engaging in conduct that would be permissible at 
common law.  We must therefore consider his expectations to determine 
whether notice has been given of the servitude placed upon his property.225 
3.  Personal Versus Commercial Uses 
The logic of the preceding analysis applies to copying in support of both 
personal and commercial uses.  It is appropriate, however, for courts to 
draw a distinction between the two.  First, doing so is consistent with 
traditional understandings of copyright.226 
Second, commercial entities are routinely expected to be aware that their 
activities may be regulated in a way that purely private actions are not.227  
Just so with respect to implied authorization.  An entity that makes its living 
off of the commercial exploitation of copyrighted matter should understand 
the nuances of the Act and the scope of section 106 in a way that a purely 
private actor does not.  Depending on the context, however, even a 
commercial user may have a reasonable expectation that a use is authorized 
notwithstanding the lack of direct contact with the copyright holder.228  
Property is property, and commercial entities have reasonable expectations 
in their rights to their chattels just as individual users do. 
 
accompanying text, the problem is that Congress was not writing against a clean slate.  If it 
had, its language could well have been enough.  But in light of the common law backdrop 
and technical realities of the time, it is not unreasonable to require Congress to have included 
language specifying, for example, that “the personal nature of a copyright use is irrelevant to 
determining whether an exclusive right of § 106 has been violated.”  Lest this seem an 
unreasonable requirement, recall that Congress’s failure to disclaim explicitly a contributory 
infringement cause of action resulted in its recognition in Sony and Grokster. See supra Part 
II.E.3. 
 225. In the same way that servitude law requires notice, either record or inquiry, for a 
servitude to run with the land. See supra note 213. 
 226. See, e.g., infra note 281 and accompanying text. 
 227. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (“An expectation of 
privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar 
expectation in an individual’s home.  This expectation is particularly attenuated in 
commercial property employed in ‘closely regulated’ industries.” (citations omitted)). 
 228. See infra Part III.D.2.c. 
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4.  What About the Copyright Owner’s Rights? 
Another element to consider is the copyright holder’s “authorization” of 
use of his copyright.  If the reasonableness of a user’s belief in a right to use 
personal property to interact with copyrighted material depends on context, 
then the conduct of the rights holder matters as part of this context.  
Moreover, if copyright cases are the mediation of conflicting property 
claims, then courts should consider the actions of both parties to the 
conflict.  The copyright holder makes a range of choices that directly affect 
the availability of his work.  The more a work appears available for use and 
unencumbered by restrictions, the more reasonable the user’s belief that she 
may interact with it. 
a.  Create the Work 
Most fundamentally, authors choose whether to create the copyrighted 
work in the first instance.  Since copyright exists to incentivize creation, it 
seems perhaps churlish to suggest that an author should be deemed as 
consenting to anything simply by the act of creation.  But of course she 
does.  Creation of a copyrighted work leaves the author vulnerable to the 
variety of fair uses that may be made of the work.  And fair use’s 
uncertainty cuts both ways.  An author cannot determine ex ante precisely 
what uses of her work a court will determine are fair, and she creates 
despite that uncertainty. 
In many cases the claim that copyright was meant to incentivize the work 
in question is suspect.229  In others, the assertion of copyright may follow 
from a failure to utilize an alternative intellectual property regime.230  
Doctrines like the idea/expression dichotomy and the lack of 
copyrightability for facts go some distance to addressing these concerns.231 
Last, it bears remembering that authors are not legally required to create.  
To the extent they choose to do so, they do so in a world in which exclusive 
control of their creativity ends at the moment of fixation. 
b.  Publish the Work 
Publication is no longer required for copyright protection, but remains 
relevant in considering a copyright holder’s expectations of control.232  
Most famously, in holding that advance publication of Gerald Ford’s 
autobiography was not a fair use, the Supreme Court relied in large part on 
 
 229. See, e.g., Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (rejecting effort to use copyright law to shield contents of e-mails regarding problems 
with manufacturer’s voting machines). 
 230. Most famously, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 231. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
 232. In the past, creators avoided publication in order to avoid some of the tradeoffs 
inherent in the prevailing copyright statute.  For example, Disney reportedly forewent for a 
time the profits possible from distributing movies in their catalog in order to keep the works 
from being published. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 14–16. 
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the argument that the challenged use prevented Ford from being the first to 
market.233  The first fair use factor, purpose and character of the use, tilted 
in Ford publisher’s favor because the manuscript had been stolen.234  The 
second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, favored the publisher 
because Ford’s work was unpublished.235  Indeed, enough rode on Ford’s 
control of the physical manuscript, and its theft, that one could view the 
Court’s analysis as resting in part on private property considerations.236 
An analogous analysis should apply in implied authorization cases.  The 
right of first publication is powerful.237  Before its exercise, the ability of 
others to interact with copyrighted matter is necessarily constrained.  
Interferences with the first publication right may require conduct that a 
court would find unreasonable.  So one who posts large excerpts of, say, a 
stolen Harry Potter manuscript has little claim of a reasonable belief in a 
right to do so.  There are, nonetheless, contexts in which courts may be less 
solicitous of the publication right given the nature of the material.  For 
example, the maker of voting machines could not use copyright to suppress 
publication of documents detailing flaws in its product.238  Copyright 
holders in similar shoes would have no reasonable expectation that a 
memoranda’s contents would remain private if internal document control 
procedures were to break down. 
But once an author has chosen the time and place of first publication, 
user expectations of what may be done with a work necessarily change.  As 
argued above, when an author makes his work part of culture, he alters the 
environment of his audience.239  Insofar as his work achieves an audience, 
it displaces other works or components of the public domain that might 
have otherwise engaged the public.  And when a copyright holder tries to 
make his work culturally prominent, he assumes the risk that his audience 
may interact with it.240  User expectations with respect to how they may 
interact with the world around them necessarily come into play. 
 
 233. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552–53 (1985). 
 234. Id. at 563 (“The trial court found that The Nation knowingly exploited a purloined 
manuscript.  Unlike the typical claim of fair use, The Nation cannot offer up even the fiction 
of consent as justification.” (citation omitted)). 
 235. Id. at 564 (“A use that so clearly infringes the copyright holder’s interests in 
confidentiality and creative control is difficult to characterize as ‘fair.’”). 
 236. The current version of § 107 makes clear that even uses of unpublished works may 
be deemed fair. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a 
finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.”). 
 237. As noted by then-professor Breyer in his skepticism of the need to expand copyright 
protection. Breyer, supra note 56, at 299–300. 
 238. Online Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 239. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Waldron, supra note 127, at 885 (“[T]his environment, having been thrust upon 
us by those in whose interests cultural commodities circulate, is now the only one we have, 
so that it is now in a sense unfair to deny us the liberty to make of it what we will.”). 
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c.  Publish in an Easily Accessible Medium 
The medium of publication also affects reasonable expectations about 
what may be done with a copyrighted work.  Regardless of the use to which 
the copy is ultimately put, there is a difference between copying a movie 
during its initial theatrical run and its DVD incarnation.  Copyright holders 
naturally assume differing levels of risk that unauthorized use will be made 
of their work as it is made available in more accessible media. 
Further gradations are possible within a medium.  The governing norms 
of a submedium may bear on reasonable interpretations of an author’s 
conduct.  Publishing on the Internet carries different implications than 
publishing on paper.  Within the Internet context, posting to a blog that is 
accessible to others via RSS feeds is different than publishing an encrypted 
e-book available for licensed downloading.241 
d.  License Derivatives 
The displacement effect described above is especially acute when the 
rights holder engages in broad licensing of derivative works of the 
copyrighted creation.  That is to say, the Harry Potter Lexicon is much 
more likely in a world of Harry Potter movies, action figures, and school 
lunchboxes than one without.242  Current fair use law responds in a mixed 
manner to the consequences of ubiquity.  Social prominence may make 
claims of transformation more palatable,243 while also making a court more 
likely to view certain complementary markets as “belonging” ex ante to the 
copyright holder.244  The implied authorization approach would recognize 
that personal users of copyrighted material are likely to involve works that 
appear across cultural media. 
e.  Notice 
Part of the problem with relying on traditional implied license law to 
address personal use is the prospect that simple disclaimers of permission 
may suffice to negate any argument that a license has been granted.245  As 
argued above, that solution is insufficiently respectful of user property 
expectations.  That said, whether a rights holder gives notice of the scope of 
 
 241. Cf. Nimmer, supra note 38, at 39 (noting that Usenet postings “are frequently written 
in an environment in which posting and sharing are the expected norms” and that the 
“universal expectation of netiquette is that these postings will be forwarded” but suggesting 
that the creation of other legal regimes may be appropriate to address the issue). 
 242. See Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(enjoining publication of Lexicon). 
 243. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“[The Wind Done Gone] uses several of [Gone With the Wind’s] most famous lines, 
but vests them with a completely new significance.”). 
 244. See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (weighing market effect factor against maker of quiz book about Seinfeld even 
though copyright owner had not entered market). 
 245. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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permitted use of her work (and the prominence of that notice) is at least a 
factor to consider when determining the objective reasonableness of a use 
made of the work. 
f.  Use of Access Controls 
Just as a publisher’s choice of media affects the ease with which a 
copyist may interact with a work, so too does the use of digital rights 
management (DRM) or similar access controls.  The more work needed on 
the user’s end to engage in the desired act, the less reasonable a belief in a 
right to copy the material. 
Of course, DRM raises important issues regarding fair use rights and 
consumer expectations.246  Publishing copyrighted material with DRM or 
similar access controls should not be seen as necessarily precluding implied 
authorization.  It is, however, indicative of an assertion of control in the 
copyrighted material that may suffice to negate the authorization implied by 
the simple ownership of copying tools by the user.  And, indeed, use of 
such access controls may impose a cost on the copyright holder with respect 
to customer relations and product popularity.247 
g.  Availability and Utilization of Takedown Procedures 
17 U.S.C. § 512 sets forth detailed procedures by which a copyright 
holder may direct an Internet Service Provider to remove purportedly 
infringing material from its network.  As a result, web page viewers have 
reason to assume publically available websites that host third-party 
copyrighted content to be fair game for interaction.  To illustrate, many 
websites make new music available for download.248  A web surfer 
encountering such a site is likely to assume the right to download the music 
insofar as the website is public and has not been shut down (or had 
infringing content removed) by objecting copyright holders.  The 
reasonable assumption, instead, is that the music is provided to the site to 
make available for download for promotional purposes (i.e., in hopes that 
consumers will then purchase the underlying albums or tickets to live 
performances).  In contrast, one who encounters music on an anonymous 
peer-to-peer network could not reasonably make a similar assumption.249 
 
 246. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 247. See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, EMI Says DRM-Free Music Is Selling Well, ARS TECHNICA 
(June 20, 2007), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/06/emi-says-drm-free-music-is-
selling-well.ars (detailing sales improvements after DRM dropped from for-sale music); Ben 
Kuchera, Gamers Fight Back Against Lackluster Spore Gameplay, Bad DRM, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 8, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/gaming/news/2008/09/gamers-fight-back-
against-lackluster-spore-gameplay-bad-drm.ars (describing user unhappiness with DRM of 
computer game Spore).  
 248. See, e.g., MBV, http://www.mbvmusic.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). 
 249. See also infra Part III.D.2.b. 
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h.  Cease and Desist 
Finally, copyright holders may both authorize use of their works under 
section 106 and withdraw such authorization.  Whether the copyright holder 
has ordered the user to stop is obviously relevant to determining the 
reasonableness of a copyright use.  This banal observation underscores a 
more important point.  If part of the danger of excessively sweeping 
copyright rights is the ex ante chilling of socially beneficial activity, then a 
corrective is to treat uses that follow an explicit objection from a rights 
holder less leniently than those that precede such an objection. 
C.  Is this Fair to Rights Holders? 
Is the framework proposed herein “fair” to copyright holders?  To some 
extent, the answer lies outside the scope of this Article and instead in the 
literature questioning whether copyrights are justified at their current 
strength.  An argument that would, if implemented, lessen copyright’s 
power is more just if copyrights are already too powerful and less so if they 
are not.  And, of course, the focus here is not on copyright holder rights but 
on vindicating independent property interests held by individuals in the 
tools they use to interact with copyrighted material. 
That said, the argument presented here is, if not demonstrably just in the 
abstract, at least nothing radical in its respect for the property rights of 
copyright holders.250  First, authorization rights remain with the copyright 
holders.  Requiring rights holders to take steps to ensure that their property 
not be used in an objectionable way is consistent with traditional property 
conceptions.  Property law accords less protection to owners who fail to 
maintain control of their property.  Property may be lost through adverse 
possession or abandonment,251 and others may gain use rights through 
implied or prescriptive easements or licenses that become irrevocable 
through reliance.252  And the requirement that property owners opt-out of 
 
 250. Once again assuming arguendo that copyrights are property. 
 251. But cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 399 
(2010) (observing that “[t]he conventional account holds that at common law, corporeal 
hereditaments like fee simple interests could not be abandoned but incorporeal interests (e.g., 
easements, mineral interests, and licenses) could” and criticizing common law hostility to 
abandonment of real property). 
 252. In discussing implied license in the patent context, Mark Janis points to cases in 
which the presence of waters on private property creates an implied license to navigate them 
until the owner remedies their presence. Janis, supra note 2, at 505 n.475; cf. Litman, Lawful 
Personal Use, supra note 6, at 1917 (observing that the “property law solution” to the 
“mess” of divisible copyright rights “is the easement by implication”).  And outside the 
traditional property context, admiralty law provides salvors the right to demand 
compensation from owners of rescued property. 2 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND 
MARITIME LAW § 16-1 (4th ed. 2004) (listing formal elements of a general maritime law 
salvage claim:  “(1) there must be a marine peril placing the property at risk of loss, 
destruction, or deterioration; (2) the salvage service must be voluntarily rendered and not 
required by an existing duty or by special contract; and (3) the salvage efforts must be 
successful, in whole or in part”). 
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uses of their property is not alien to the world of real property.253  Similar 
principles should apply in intellectual property law.254  Copyright holders 
who choose not to publish or decide not to publish widely will naturally 
receive greater protection.  But those who wish to reap the benefits of 
releasing their work into the wild must take the bitter with the sweet. 
Second, an objection focused on fairness to copyright holders must be 
specific about which copyright holders face unfair treatment.  Many 
unauthorized or tolerated copyright uses benefit the copyright holder.  So 
free distribution of an album may stimulate later demand.255  Fan 
communities that make use of copyrighted material may enhance the 
popularity of a work and create demand for sequels or other derivative 
works.256  But if fears of copyright enforcement deter such uses then 
authors who would benefit from them lose out from the assumption that 
nothing is permitted absent explicit consent.  And that consent may be 
costly to give insofar as copyright holders face difficulty in precisely 
calibrating authorization so that it is understood without being seen as 
authorizing unacceptable works.257  Further, many copyright holders no 
longer wish to assert control over their works, but will not or cannot expend 
effort to communicate that signal, contributing to the “orphan work” 
problem.  Because there is no one to authorize use, projects are unable to 
proceed for fear that a lawsuit might arise after investment, creating the risk 
 
 253. Tim Wu notes the example of requiring owners of rural property to post no 
trespassing notices for trespass liability to exist. Wu, supra note 210, at 621 (citing N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-2115 (McKinney 2010)), 625; Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting 
and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 558 (2004) (noting that “twenty-
nine states require posting to exclude hunters” and collecting statutes). 
 254. A trademark is abandoned, for example, when “its use has been discontinued with 
intent not to resume such use” or “any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of 
omission as well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the goods 
or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to lose its significance as a 
mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  Abandonment is a defense to an infringement claim. Id. 
§ 1115(b)(2).  Three years without use is prima facie evidence of abandonment. Id. § 1127. 
 255. As was famously the case for the Wilco album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot. Yankee Hotel 
Foxtrot, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yankee_Hotel_Foxtrot (last visited Oct. 23, 
2010). 
 256. To take a recent example of the former, a wedding video set to the tune of Chris 
Brown’s song Forever became a viral hit online.  Because YouTube employs content 
management tools to aid copyright holders in monetizing content, Brown’s label was able to 
sell the song directly to viewers watching the video.  Sales of the single shot up as a result of 
the user-generated content.  Chris La Rosa & Ali Sandler, I Now Pronounce You Monetized:  
A YouTube Video Case Study, THE OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (July 30, 2009, 9:32 AM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/i-now-pronounce-you-monetized-youtube.html. 
The making of the movie Serenity, based on the short-lived science fiction series Firefly, is 
an example of fan culture stimulating further demand for copyrighted work. Jeff Jensen & 
Jeff Labrecque, “Serenity” How?, ENTM’T WEEKLY, Sept. 9, 2005, available at 
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,1102753,00.html. 
 257. See Wu, supra note 210, at 628 (discussing potential efficiency of a copyright “No 
Action Policy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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of a holdup.258  In short, the fairness objection has to explain why one class 
of copyright holders is to be favored at the expense of others. 
D.  Applications/Implications 
This section explores some of the implications of the above analysis by 
applying the implied authorization framework both to historic copyright 
debates and some modern issues. 
1.  Past Applications 
Looking back to the development of the first-sale doctrine and the pre-
1976 history of the performance right reveals that there is nothing 
remarkable about the focus on user property rights discussed above.  More 
recent precedents involving Google’s search activities and the DMCA are in 
accord. 
a.  First Sale 
In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,259 the Supreme Court established the 
first-sale doctrine by refusing to give effect to a notice printed in copies of a 
novel that forbade resale at less than retail price.  The Court concluded that 
the copyright holder’s statutory right to “vend” the work did not extend so 
far.260  The Court styled its opinion as an exercise in statutory interpretation 
conducted “in the light of its main purpose to secure the right of multiplying 
copies of the work.”261  But the decision looks more like the preservation of 
user property interests against copyright encroachment. 
The Court hinted that a plausible argument could be made that the right 
to “vend” extended to later sales,262 but it did not tarry long over the 
prospect.  Instead, it concluded that one sale constituted the full exercise of 
the right.263  The need to protect common law property rights appears to 
have guided the conclusion that the right of vending only encompassed one 
sale. 
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell the 
copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the reservation of 
the right to have the remedies of the statute against an infringer because of 
 
 258. The problem is especially acute in the context of orphan works. See, e.g., U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS (2006), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf. 
 259. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).  Congress codified the doctrine in the 1909 Act. 17 U.S.C. § 27 
(1909) (repealed 1976); see 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:19. 
 260. 210 U.S. at 350–51. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 351 (“True, the statute also secures, to make [the right of copying] effectual, 
the sole right to vend copies of the book . . . .”). 
 263. Id. (“[Plaintiff] has exercised the right to vend.”). 
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the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless the purchaser sells at a 
price fixed in the notice. 264 
The Court’s concern for the clean “title” of downstream purchasers 
stemmed largely from copyright’s limited nature.  It exists only as “the 
special creation of the statute.”265  Common law property expectations 
could not so lightly be disturbed without actual privity of contract with the 
personal property owner (or a clearer directive from Congress).266 
b.  Performance Rights 
The federal courts considered the scope of copyright performance rights 
multiple times before the 1976 rewrite of the Copyright Act.  These cases 
required ascertaining the extent to which copyright holders could control 
music once it was embodied in a licensed broadcast.  Did listeners become 
performers simply by turning their radios on?  The modern statute provides 
detailed rules for when the owner of a broadcast receiver becomes a 
performer.267  But before Congress clarified matters, the courts adopted a 
view consistent with the implied authorization approach. 
In Buck v. Debaum,268 the plaintiff accused a café owner of infringement 
because the café customers could overhear music from an on-site radio.  
The California district court rejected the claim, focusing on the copyright 
holder’s decision to license the copyright for broadcast.  Once that decision 
was made, plaintiffs “impliedly sanctioned and consented to any ‘pick up’ 
out of the air that was possible in radio reception.”269  A copyright owner 
who wished to exercise full control over the “property” interest in the music 
composition had the option of refusing to authorize performance by the 
 
 264. Id. (emphasis added). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 350 (noting that purchasers “made no agreement as to the control of future 
sales of the book, and took upon themselves no obligation to enforce the notice printed in the 
book”); cf. 4 PATRY, supra note 43, § 13:18 (noting Bobbs-Merrill as indicative of judicial 
reaction “against attempts to impose restraints on the alienation of tangible property”). 
  Similar logic supported the patent exhaustion doctrine.  It relied on a demarcation 
between patent exclusion rights, created by federal statute, and rights to use an object, 
governed by state common law property rights. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“And when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no 
longer within the limits of the monopoly.  It passes outside of it, and is no longer under the 
protection of the act of Congress.”); id. at 550 (“The implement or machine becomes his 
private, individual property, not protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws 
of the State in which it is situated.”); id. at 553 (“[I]t can hardly be maintained that Congress 
could lawfully deprive a citizen of the use of his property after he had purchased the absolute 
and unlimited right from the inventor, and when that property was no longer held under the 
protection and control of the General Government, but under the protection of the 
State . . . .”). 
 267. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006). 
 268. 40 F.2d 734 (S.D. Cal. 1929).  Then-current copyright law gave the copyright holder 
the exclusive right to perform musical compositions publicly for profit. 
 269. Id. at 735. 
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broadcast station.  Once so authorized, however, further control over the 
airwaves270 or listener equipment was inappropriate.271 
The Supreme Court curtailed Debaum’s scope two years later in Buck v. 
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co.272 and held that a hotel performed the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted work when guests could hear broadcasts through the hotel’s 
radio and loud speakers.  The Court stopped short of abrogating Debaum, 
but rejected much of its reasoning.  For the Court it was significant that the 
broadcast in Jewell was unlicensed.  “It may be that proper control over 
broadcasting programs would automatically secure to the copyright owner 
sufficient protection from unauthorized public performances by use of a 
radio receiving set . . . .”273  In other words, the Court held open the 
possibility that the implied license logic of Debaum would have prevailed 
had the broadcast been licensed.274 
And indeed the Court steadily walked back its reasoning in Jewell in the 
twilight years of the 1909 Act.  Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc.275 concluded that the operations of a CATV system, which 
used cable to transmit broadcast signals received from hill-mounted 
antennae to subscriber homes, did not constitute performances under the 
copyright statute.276  The Court limited Jewell to its facts, noting that the 
case did not involve a situation in which the initial transmission was 
authorized.277  The Court drew a distinction, based in part on Debaum’s 
reasoning, between viewers and performers.  Although user property 
interests did not overtly guide the opinion, the majority cited the role that 
viewer-owned equipment brings to the viewer/performer relationship.  The 
Court recognized that people use property to interact with copyrighted 
material as members of the audience and doing so does not subject them to 
copyright’s regulation.278  The background right to use one’s property as 
one chooses absent clear legal rules to the contrary is a component of this 
conclusion. 
If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, 
and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be 
“performing” the programs he received on his television set.  The result 
would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative 
 
 270. Id. at 736 (copyright holder who licenses work “must be held to have acquiesced in 
the utilization of all forces of nature that are resultant from the licensed broadcast of his 
copyrighted musical composition”). 
 271. Id. (noting unreasonableness of expecting radio owners to turn dial if a copyright-
protected music were broadcast in between unprotected matter). 
 272. 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
 273. Id. at 199. 
 274. Id. n.5. 
 275. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 276. Id. at 399–400; see also Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 
394 (1974). 
 277. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396–97 n.18; see also id. at 401 n.30 (contending Jewell’s 
application would “retroactively . . . impose copyright liability where it has never been 
acknowledged to exist before”). 
 278. Id. at 398. 
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antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is 
that the antenna system is erected and owned not by its users but by an 
entrepreneur. 279 
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken280 pounded the final nail in 
Jewell’s coffin by finding no public performance where a restaurant 
operator had connected his radio to ceiling loudspeakers.  Once again, the 
opinion did not explicitly rely on user property rights but framed its 
conclusions to respect them.  Like Debaum, Aiken emphasized the 
consequences to user property rights if the strong copyright argument were 
taken to its logical conclusion. 
 And a ruling that a radio listener ‘performs’ every broadcast that he 
receives would be highly inequitable for two distinct reasons.  First, a 
person in Aiken’s position would have no sure way of protecting himself 
from liability for copyright infringement except by keeping his radio set 
turned off.  For even if he secured a license from ASCAP, he would have 
no way of either foreseeing or controlling the broadcast of compositions 
whose copyright was held by someone else.  Secondly, to hold that all in 
Aiken’s position ‘performed’ these musical compositions would be to 
authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a 
single public rendition of a copyrighted work.  The exaction of such 
multiple tribute would go far beyond what is required for the economic 
protection of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the 
balanced congressional purpose behind 17 U.S.C. [§] 1(e)[.]281 
Congress would soon undo the Court’s handiwork with respect to most 
commercial establishments.282  But again, the argument here is not that 
Congress may not interfere with a user’s property-based expectations.  It is 
rather that courts may honor those expectations where the Copyright Act 
text is sufficiently open.  Those expectations have some descriptive force in 
the performance rights cases.  If a copyright holder chooses to authorize the 
transmission of her protected material, she assumes the risk that others will 
interact with it using their own property.  To the extent those uses are 
reasonable, courts should not lightly conclude that the copyright monopoly 
extends to control the downstream property of those who encounter and 
then use the works. 
c.  Chamberlain 
The Federal Circuit has used user property rights to blunt some of the 
sharper edges of the DMCA.  Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink 
 
 279. Id. at 400. 
 280. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).  The majority dismissed Jewell as perhaps applicable to a 
contributory infringement situation. Id. at 160 n.11. 
 281. Id. at 162–63 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 282. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006); cf. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 164–65 (Blackmun, J., concurring 
in the result) (noting that defendant in Aiken was not a “mere listener” but benefitted 
commercially from use of the radio). 
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Technologies, Inc.283 considered whether the DMCA creates liability for the 
manufacturer of a replacement garage door opener remote control.284  The 
plaintiff contended that defendant’s opener circumvented controls guarding 
“access” to the purportedly copyrighted computer code controlling its 
device.285  The court held that copyright rights could not be leveraged in 
this manner to control the market for complementary goods. 
The court’s reasoning utilized a range of arguments.  For present 
purposes, the relevant portion of the Federal Circuit’s opinion concerned 
the requirement that a DMCA circumvention claim requires that the access 
in question must be taken “without the authority of the copyright owner.”286  
The statute could be interpreted to mean that such authorization requires 
actual assent from the copyright holder.  The court instead took a broader 
view of the relevant context. 
Because lack of authorization is an element of a DMCA claim, the court 
concluded that the burden of establishing it rests with the plaintiff.287  In 
determining whether access was unauthorized, the panel looked not to the 
statements of the copyright holder, but also considered what is generally 
authorized by copyright law.288  Here, consumer property rights matter; 
garage-door purchasers are allowed to use the devices regardless of whether 
the sellers conveyed explicit authorization to do so.289  They retain this 
right notwithstanding copyright.  “Like all property owners taking 
legitimate steps to protect their property, however, copyright owners relying 
on the anti-circumvention provisions remain bound by all other relevant 
bodies of law,” and the DMCA did not change “the legal landscape 
governing the reasonable expectations of consumers or competitors.”290  If 
the copyright holder wanted to deauthorize the use in question, its hopes 
would have to lie in an explicit contractual understanding.291 
 
 283. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 284. Id. at 1182–83. 
 285. Id. at 1185. 
 286. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
 287. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1203–04. 
 288. Id. at 1193 (“The premise underlying this initial assignment of burden is that the 
copyright laws authorize members of the public to access a work, but not to copy it.  The law 
therefore places the burden of proof on the party attempting to establish that the 
circumstances of its case deviate from these normal expectations . . . .”). 
 289. Id.  To be sure, the panel did not see itself as broadening the understanding of what 
is generally deemed authorized copying (as opposed to access). Id. (“[D]efendants must 
prove authorized copying[,] and plaintiffs must prove unauthorized access.”). 
 290. Id. at 1194.  The opinion elsewhere expresses concern that an overly broad 
interpretation of the DMCA action would permit copyright holders to restrict consumer use 
of personal property. Id. at 1201 (“Chamberlain’s proposed construction would allow any 
manufacturer of any product to add a single copyrighted sentence or software fragment to its 
product, wrap the copyrighted material in a trivial ‘encryption’ scheme, and thereby gain the 
right to restrict consumers’ rights to use its products in conjunction with competing 
products.”). 
 291. Id. at 1202 n.17 (noting that it is unclear whether DMCA liability exists for 
consumer who “circumvents a technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted 
work in a manner that enables uses permitted under the Copyright Act but prohibited by 
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2.  Prospective Applications 
This part concludes by considering some prospective implications of 
implied authorization. 
a.  User-Generated Content 
Implied authorization creates an alternative, non-fair-use-reliant basis for 
protecting user-generated content and communities dedicated to 
reimagining and repurposing characters and settings from popular works.292  
User created content is ubiquitous in part because users expect that they 
have a right to interact with the culture around them, albeit generally 
subject to a norm of non-commercial exploitation.293  When fan-driven 
activities stay on the non-commercial side of the line, copyright holders 
often welcome their efforts.294 
But not always.  This creates uncertainty even when such appropriation 
may be beneficial or at least not harmful to the copyright owner.  Edward 
Lee has proposed an approach for identifying which uses of this nature are 
appropriate.295  The implied authorization framework goes further by 
providing a basis for viewing such uses as legal by bringing user rights and 
expectations into the picture. 
Creators of non-commercial user-generated content are not pirates; they 
are fulfilling a natural impulse to engage in self expression.  Copyright 
owners who expended effort to be part of the world of their audience have 
reduced grounds for complaint when the predictable happens.  And 
allowing rights holders broad authority to go after users threatens the 
interests of other rights holders who benefit from such “tolerated” uses.296 
To be sure, copyright holders have rights vis-à-vis fan and related 
communities.  But it is reasonable to require the affirmative (as opposed to 
passive) exercise of those rights (e.g., by the use of notice-and-takedown 
 
contract” but noting that plaintiff “did not attempt to limit its customers use of its product by 
contract” and reserving issue). 
 292. See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:  Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New 
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651 (1997). 
 293. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 295. See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1459, 1494–95 (proposing a five-factor test for informal copyright practices to identify 
situations in which the “development of an informal copyright practice [is] more likely and 
more legitimate”).  Several of Professor Lee’s factors would be relevant to the question of 
implied authorization.  His non-exhaustive list of factors is: 
(1) unlitigated use and the absence of settled case law finding the practice or type 
of practice in question constitutes an infringement; 
(2) the existence of a novel issue of law, such as one involving a new technology; 
(3) the existence of a colorable fair use defense, or other exemption or defense; 
(4) high transaction costs in obtaining formal licenses from copyright holders; and 
(5) no express objection by the copyright holder as to the particular use in question 
or the type of practice, or some indication that the copyright holder might allow it. 
Id. at 1494. 
 296. See supra notes 255–57 and accompanying text. 
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procedures) before creators of user-generated content find themselves on 
the receiving end of a damages claim.  This largely tracks the norms and 
practices of such communities, but it should be understood as the balance 
struck between competing property rights and not the byproduct of 
copyright holder beneficence or sluggishness in assertion of their rights. 
b.  Everyday Certainty 
Implied authorization also provides legal grounding for everyday non-
authorial activities taking place on the Internet, many of which we take for 
granted as legal.  We forward e-mail and view publicly accessible websites 
without a thought to copyright ramifications.  As noted above, traditional 
conceptions of implied license go a long way toward providing legal 
comfort to such uses to the extent such comfort is necessary.297 
Implied authorization may also mitigate the risk of “copytraps.”298  
Suppose a consumer innocently comes across a website offering free music 
downloads that turn out to be illicit.  Should she be subject to suit?  An 
affirmative answer could chill a range of legitimate commerce, as many 
copyright holders wish to use such websites to promote their work.  The 
fear of running afoul of copyright laws, moreover, could lead risk-averse 
users to restrict their browsing or downloading activities to websites with 
official affiliation to major content owners like the broadcast networks or 
movie studios, creating a barrier to entry for lesser known, but equally 
legitimate, alternatives. 
One response would be to amend the Copyright Act to relieve the burden 
of its strict liability provisions.299  But a similar effect could be 
accomplished if courts take user property rights seriously.  As argued 
above,300 if a website is public, and subject to the notice-and-takedown 
regime of 17 U.S.C. § 512, then Internet users should be permitted to rely 
on the publicly accessible nature of a site.  In other words, downloading 
from an anonymous peer-to-peer network is not the same thing as doing so 
from a public website.  Some boundary issues may arise with respect to 
sites based outside the United States, but the implied authorization 
framework offers a mechanism for providing assurance that innocent 
conduct will not be a basis for liability.301 
The need to provide consumers with certainty that their conduct will not 
produce liability for money damages extends beyond actual litigation 
danger, which is low in many if not most contemporary “copytrap” settings.  
 
 297. See supra notes 110–11 and accompanying text. 
 298. See generally Ned Snow, Copytraps, 84 IND. L.J. 285 (2009). 
 299. See id. at 323. 
 300. See supra Part III.B.4.g. 
 301. Cf. Lee, supra note 295, at 1496–99 (applying informality test to label photocopying 
for personal use a legitimate practice while concluding that unauthorized music file sharing 
is illegitimate). 
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Danger also lies in the pressure placed on technology manufacturers or 
providers to limit the capabilities of their products.302 
c.  The “Fairness” of Opt-Out Requirements 
If it is true that copyright holders should be expected to engage in self-
protection to avoid audience intermeddling,303 then courts should be more 
receptive to “opt-out” regimes with respect to copyright uses. 
Opt out is controversial, as demonstrated by the fallout from Google’s 
attempt to use an opt-out model in digitizing books into a searchable 
database.  But an implied authorization defense of opt out is not a far way 
off from the approach taken by Field v. Google Inc.304  Field involved a 
challenge to the search engine model itself.305  Google indexes the Internet 
on an opt-out system.  That is, its indexing programs will respect the wishes 
of site owners who do not want to be indexed by Google if they include a 
machine-readable metatag (invisible to viewers of the page) to that effect.  
This method emerged as the industry norm, likely because most websites 
want to be found.306  The plaintiff nonetheless “decided to manufacture a 
claim for copyright infringement . . . in the hopes of making money from 
Google’s standard practice” by placing material online, allowing Google’s 
robots to index it, and bringing suit.307 
The district court rejected the attempt for a variety of reasons, including 
fair use and estoppel, but of note here was its invocation and approval of 
Google’s implied license defense.  Though Field has been criticized for 
straying from the doctrine’s traditional bounds,308 it fits well into the 
framework advocated by this Article.  The plaintiff ignored norms—
industry standards in the court’s telling—regarding acceptable use of his 
copyrighted material, and refrained from taking a simple step to prevent 
Google’s use of his work.309  The court viewed this conduct as conveying 
permission to Google to use the author’s work,310 but it can as easily be 
interpreted as a failure to adequately assert rights against Google’s 
reasonable expectation—based on prevailing norms—of a right to use its 
own property to interact with material placed on the Internet. 
 
 302. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 304. 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006). 
 305. Though it is not the only one. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 
F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 306. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
 307. Id. at 1113. 
 308. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 
1226 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]hough not seemingly acknowledged by the district court in 
Field, the Ninth Circuit has explained that the implied license doctrine in copyright cases is 
to be very narrowly construed.”). 
 309. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 310. Id. (“[Plaintiff’s] conduct is reasonably interpreted as a grant of a license to Google 
for that use.”). 
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To be sure, in examples like Google Books courts might consider the 
difference between works set free on the Internet instead of into the world 
of hard-bound copies in determining precisely where to draw the line 
between opt-in or opt-out mechanisms.311  But if copyright disputes are 
more than simple trespass situations, then opt-out requirements for 
copyright owners are reasonable for ameliorating the conflict between 
competing property interests.312 
d.  Fair Use 
Basing implied authorization on user property rights and gaps in the 
Copyright Act addresses the problem of establishing a non-fair-use-reliant 
basis for asserting strong user rights in the face of copyright claims.  It 
avoids the body of doctrine that has grown around fair use and the prospect 
that fair use precedents may be insufficiently flexible to protect personal 
use rights. 
That is not to say that the preceding is irrelevant to fair use.  As a 
doctrinal matter, the implied authorization framework could be 
implemented through the fair use defense.  Indeed, fair use is the simplest 
route by which the property rights of users could be imported into an 
infringement analysis.  Even though implied authorization draws from a 
body of law independent of fair use, section 107 of the Copyright Act may 
still be the best vehicle for presenting it in a doctrinally cognizable manner. 
Focusing on competing property interests could also help broaden current 
conceptions of fair use, with user property rights giving courts a basis for 
expanding the considerations at play in fair use analysis.  Rather than a way 
to circumvent fair use’s rigidity, implied authorization may be a means for 
breathing new life into section 107.313  At the same time, focusing on 
mediating competing property claims in light of existing norms would 
provide guideposts for judges worried that fair use may become a blank 
check for widespread infringement. 
e.  Taking Context Seriously 
Using implied authorization within the fair use framework also takes 
seriously the Supreme Court’s command that evaluating copyright fair use 
claims is a contextual endeavor.  This dictate frustrates personal copyright 
uses because of the inability to secure ex ante certainty that a particular use 
 
 311. See supra Part III.B.4.c. 
 312. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (1979) (stating that in a nuisance case, 
“the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm” is an “important” factor in 
evaluating the gravity of the harm). 
 313. For example, whether a user is exercising personal property rights has ready 
applicability to the first fair use factor:  the purpose and character of the challenged use.  
Courts could treat as relevant whether the defendant had a reasonable property-backed 
expectation that her use was authorized.  A court could similarly evaluate the conduct of the 
copyright holder in determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct. 
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is legal.  But if our right to use our property to interact with the world is 
contextual, depending in part on our understanding that a particular use is 
both illegal under the Copyright Act as well as unauthorized, might that 
mean that ambiguity with respect to a use’s legality may excuse a use later 
found to be infringing? 
The objective reasonableness of a user’s belief that she had the right to 
interact with copyrighted material helps determine whether that use is 
implicitly authorized.  To the extent that copyright law (and the conduct of 
the copyright holder) makes clear that such use is unauthorized, then the 
user’s claim to a reasonable property-backed expectation is questionable.  
Conversely, if the legal status of an act is untested or ambiguous, the claim 
to reasonableness is stronger.314 
In the current copyright context, rights holders may be pleased to have so 
much up in the air.  After all, uncertainty about a use’s legality may 
redound to their benefit when cease-and-desist letters are mailed.  Since 
many copyright users lack the resources to pursue litigation (or are ill-
equipped to face the prospect of an adverse judgment), the assertion of 
claims has an obvious in terrorem effect.  Given those effects, copyright 
holders have an incentive to avoid declaratory judgment actions that might 
preemptively establish the legality of particular uses and undermine the 
deterrent value of uncertainty.315 
But what if this uncertainty could benefit users as well as copyright 
owners?  What if doctrinal muddiness could offer a basis for excusing a 
defendant’s conduct?  If the defendant’s objective reasonableness is a factor 
to consider in determining whether her use of copyrighted matter was 
authorized, then the state of the law is an appropriate factor to consider. 
The creation of what might be called a “qualified immunity” for 
copyright users offers a number of benefits.  Qualified immunity is a 
doctrine in civil rights law.  Federal law provides a cause of action against 
those who act under color of state law to cause “the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution” and certain 
federal laws.316  Qualified immunity excuses such violations where the 
government official’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”317  The Supreme Court views the doctrine as balancing the need to 
deter civil rights violations with the need to provide government officials 
with breathing space to act in settings in which legal uncertainty could deter 
potentially beneficial conduct.318  Copyright law also tries to strike a 
 
 314. Cf. supra note 295 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Lee’s proposed 
framework). 
 315. See supra note 61. 
 316. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 317. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 318. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (“Qualified immunity 
balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they 
exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, 
and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”). 
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balance:  it seeks to protect the rights of creators in their expressions while 
ensuring a sufficient public domain for everyone else.  But uncertainty 
about the line separating infringement from lawful use may deter socially 
beneficial copyright uses, leaving society as a whole worse off.  If users 
could expect that reasonable uses would at least be excused from money 
damages, then more of these deterred works might come into existence.  
Nor is this necessarily a bad deal for copyright holders.  If prospective 
plaintiffs also had something to lose from unsettled copyright law, perhaps 
more would be clarified.319 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright has been around long enough for us to forget just how 
extraordinary it is.  Copyright holders may invoke the coercive apparatus of 
the state to regulate the private exercise of property rights.  They may do so 
regardless of whether the regulated property owners are engaged in 
commercial activity that might threaten the copyright holder’s commercial 
monopoly on the sale of works that embody the copyright.  Normalizing 
this state of affairs by calling it part and parcel of the “property” owned by 
the copyright holder obscures copyright’s parallel status as an interference 
with property rights. 
Keeping this interference in mind makes copyright’s aspiration to 
property status less impressive.  A variety of doctrines mediate competing 
claims where both sides have property rights.  So it is with copyright law, 
where copyright’s negative easement competes with, and often yields to, 
the property rights of users, e.g., with the first-sale doctrine.  Similar 
collisions occur when copyright holders seek control over the tools 
copyright users use to interact with copyrighted material.  Calling copyright 
“property” tells us nothing about how to resolve these disputes.  
Somebody’s property rights will be curtailed. 
To know who loses, we must look not to property rhetoric but to the law.  
When we do, we see that property rights matter, but they do not always 
favor copyright holders.  User property rights are rooted in the common 
 
 319. The proper lessons of civil rights law as applied to the copyright context could be an 
article unto itself.  To the extent we want to keep the analogy a close one, it is worth noting 
that the Supreme Court recently diluted qualified immunity doctrine’s ability to “clearly 
establish” law by abandoning the requirement that a court determine whether the alleged 
facts make out a constitutional violation before determining whether the right in question 
was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), once required courts to engage 
in a two-step inquiry.  First, the court had to determine whether the plaintiff alleged a 
violation of a constitutional right.  If so, the court had to consider whether said right was 
“clearly established” at the time of the challenged act. Id. at 201.  The Court modified the 
rule in 2009 to permit judges to exercise discretion in deciding whether to address both 
prongs of the Saucier inquiry, meaning courts can simply conclude that the right is not 
clearly established and do nothing to aid in that endeavor. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818 (“On 
reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set 
forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.”).  That said, 
even after Pearson, courts retain the ability to use qualified immunity doctrine to clarify the 
state of the law and an analogous doctrine could play a similar part in copyright law. 
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law, not statute.  Where a statute alters the common law baseline it must do 
so clearly.  This principle has been used to expand copyright’s scope into 
third party liability, but it also could provide a basis for limiting copyright’s 
reach.  To the extent the 1976 Copyright Act fails to clearly redefine 
longstanding user expectations of rights to interact with protected content, 
those common law expectations may effectively curtail copyright.  In 
particular, the statute’s open text surrounding a copyright holder’s ability to 
“authorize” certain acts with respect to her work invites courts to consider 
whether the copyright holder has exercised sufficient control over her 
property to undermine the property-backed expectations of users, which 
may also be rooted in widely held social norms. 
The alternative is to assume that Congress sweepingly—and without 
express comment—curtailed the property interests of millions of citizens 
with only limited room for courts to protect private property against 
overreaching copyright claims.  There may be reasons to believe that 
proposition, but a dedication to the sanctity of property is not one of them. 
 
